How to Really Overcome Procrastination

Increase the Pain of Accessing Irrelevant Tasks

A lot of blogs give tips on how to increase productivity. However, most of them are ill-written and inaccurate. But, more importantly, no one has given a theory behind procrastination.

Let us start with the theory of how humans appraise decisions. Suppose that you want to eat a pizza. However, you discovered that it takes twenty minutes to drive to the pizza store. What would you feel? You will probably refuse to buy the pizza. However, if the time was shorter, then you might choose to drive to the store. The shorter the time, the more likely you will choose to purchase a pizza.

Let us say that the pizza increases your pleasure. Let us say that driving to the store increases your pain. So, to put it more abstractly, the greater the ratio of pleasure to pain, the more likely you will make a decision.

This has some practical applications in overcoming procrastination. You could simply increase the pain to prevent making those decisions. For example, if you want to quit watching television. However, it is likely that you will watch it in the future, unless you throw out the television. Throwing out the television will increase the pain of driving to the store to buy another television. Therefore, this increased pain will reduce your likelihood of purchasing a new television. This is similar to the pizza example.

If the television is right in front of you, it would be very easy for to resume your procrastination. But throwing it out would make it harder to access. You wouldn't want to drive to the electronic store in order to watch television. Compared to the difficulty of driving to the store, you might be more likely to be motivated by completing your main task instead of procrastinating.

Suppose you want to reduce your Internet browsing to increase productivity. However, at times, you will procrastinate and resume your browsing. As shown above, a solution to reduce your Internet browsing is to unplug the Internet cable. This will increases your pain of re-plugging it that you will less likely procrastinate.

Decrease the Pain of Accessing Your Main Task

Another aspect of this is that you can reduce procrastination by decreasing the pain to access your productive tasks. For example, if you want to be more productive, such as eating healthy foods more often, you might want to make these foods easy to access. The more you can easily access these foods, the more likely you will decide those foods compared to the harder-to-access foods.

Another aspect, as shown above, is to make the unhealthy foods harder to access.

Assume that you are a writer, and you have to finish some writing project stored in some text files in a folder. Suppose you already have unplugged your Internet cables, thrown out your television. But even though you increased the pain of accessing the irrelevant tasks, you still are not motivated to increase your productivity. You still procrastinate. An additional technique to decrease procrastination is to create shortcuts to your writing folder and shortcuts to your text files on the desktop. In this way, you it would be easier to access. As said above, the easier to access, the more likely you will choose this.

The main point in decreasing procrastination is to increase your difficulty of accessing irrelevant tasks and to decrease the difficulty of accessing your tasks you want to accomplish.

This has indeed increased my productivity by several times.

The Means-End Dichotomy: Some Clarifications

I replied to nirgraham's comment on Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy.

You start out with what seems to be a straw man.

Let me explain that you also strawmanned me.

praxeology does not ontologically assert the existance of things called 'means' and 'ends' that are actually in you. like a heart 'is in you', nor are they intended to reflect the functioning of the human mind overall.

Praxeology ontologically asserts the means/ends dichotomy because it uses a "proof by performative contradiction." Ontology is implicit in the "proof by performative contradiction." (See below).

rather they are necessary, (though not sufficient), for the possibility of economically/politicaly/(and some might say morally) analysable 'human action'/

That was what I am arguing by the term "intrumental abstraction" or "non-precisive abstraction." I said that the means/end dichotomy helps us to understand Robinson Crusoe economics and the producer/consumer goods distinction.

So praxeology asserts the means-end dichotomy as both ontologically necessary and necessary for an understanding of economics. I was only arguing against the former, not the latter. However, you assumed that I was arguing against the latter. So you strawmanned me.

does praxeology want to or need to 'reflect the /whole/ mind'?, no! it needs to reflect on the mind that 'acts', it is focused on actions. we talk about the memory in so far as it provides datum for deciding on means, we talk about empathy in that it might be datum for means etc.

I neither argued that praxeology reflects the whole mind, nor argued that cognitive psychology reflects the whole mind. It is an impossiblility for any theory to map the whole mind, because it is impossible to fuse the map with the territory. Just because I asserted that the means-end dichotomy is less precise than the desire-instinct-habit trichotomy, this does not claim that the former is false nor the latter is true. The former is just less precise.

And I did not argue that the more precision, the better. Too much precision results in unnecessary complexity, making it difficult to analyze the essentials.

what about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot

its logically necessary given our purpose, so we can...

That is a strawman.

Let us look at my whole quote:

What about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot just assume "means" and "ends" and then apply it into any economic or ethical system without justifying it by precision arguments to understanding it."

I meant that Robinson Crusoe economics could justify the means-end dichotomy, but the means-end dichotomy cannot justify Robinson Crusoe economics.

I am arguing that Robinson Crusoe economics does not need too much precision, so it could justify the means-end dichotomy. However, more complex subjects such as ethics cannot justify the means-end dichotomy, because ethics requires extreme precision. The extreme precision that ethics requires must be counterbalanced by more precisive psychology rather than unprecise means and ends.

This is the main idea that I am arguing against:

Can we derive the means-end dichotomy from human psychology? (...), we cannot.

no, we derive it from the logical impossibilty of 'human action' occurring without means... and the logical impossibility of 'action' occuring without any goal (without any preference demonstration). (if you like, we are discounting any observable behaviour that is not purpuseful as being beyond our interest, it is not a human action, but mere datum that any actioner would take into consideration, but that is all).

nirgraham argued that a performative contradiction can "prove" the means-end dichotomy. However, I oppose the "proof by proformative contradiction" argument. Even though I disagree with the "proof by performative contradiction", I still accept that argument as logically consistent. However, I question the logical soundness of the "proof by performative contradiction."

All "proofs by performative contradiction" ontologically presumes the existence of its premises. Therefore, the conclusions of the argument depend on the soundness of its premises. However, the premises cannot be perfectly sound because you cannot fuse the map with the territory. Therefore, the conclusion of the argument also cannot be perfectly sound.

I may critique the "proof by performative contradiction" in greater detail in another post.

Abstract Words

I posted a response to this discussion on the means-end dichotomy.

nirgrahamUK: http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/Ha_04.pdf ? its 4 and a half big font pages.Thank you, though not for the link. I read Human Action from beginning to end.

I mean "thank you", for demonstrating that I had not written what I meant clearly enough. Thank you for showing that I had communicated my thoughts poorly.

You have done an important thing. You have demonstrated that you have terminological differences than me. I had probably used the word "axiom" an a way differently that you had interpreted it. Thank you for taking note of the different interpretations of the words I wrote.

I will write more carefully next time. I will not just write a few sentences to explain my thoughts. I understand the impossibility to express what I had meant with those meager sentences. I learned that no one could write understandable text in philosophy, without expressing each detail in several paragraphs or even pages. Philosophy, which deals with extremely abstract ideas, will inevitably have terminological problems.

More concrete ideas, such as a "pencil", have no definitional conflicts. Almost everyone has the same definitions for "pencil", "chair", and "table". But not so with more abstract ideas, such as "state", "nature", "aggression", "subjectivism", and "objectivism". For example, libertarians commonly define a "state" as a "monopoly of violence funded by taxation". Meanwhile, brainwashed statists defines the "state" as "a beneficial institution that provides services for the population." Generally, the more abstract the idea, the more conflicts over its definition.

Philosophy, ethics, and logic have a lot of abstract ideas. Therefore, those topics would probably have a potential significant amount of terminological differences. This thread itself deals with ethics. Therefore, this thread will, and has, suffered from semantic problems.

Unfortunately, as I mentioned above, I could clearly write my thoughts clearly only if I expanded my writing. I must write several paragraphs or pages to express an idea clearly, not just in a few meager sentences.

However, we all hate to write long forum posts. As we all know, some readers do not enjoy going through long posts, because it consumes too much time.

Abstract topics, such as philosophy, ethics, and logic, make a lot of trouble in forums. Why? Because that we cannot clarify our semantics in a few sentences. It requires several paragraphs or pages to resolve a single definition.

Some members of this forum shortcut their communication. They write their ideas and critiques only in a few sentences. As we know, this will only make the text ambiguous to other members. These members think that they will save time by writing a few sentences for each idea. They think that they will save the time by not tediously going through several paragraphs or pages to describe each idea.

Wrong! This will only waste more time than doing it in the verbose way. Ambiguous text only bait irrelevant responses, strawmans, and red herrings. In addition, shortcutting their communication will only bait others to badly interpret the text, thus cause threads to go off topic. These threads will get boring, and will eventually end that way. Without a long post clarifying the terminology, those debates will never resolve.

This has happened to my long comments at blogs such as Polycentric Order. This has happened to my long posts here.

Because of this, I usually ignore debating philosophy, ethics, and logic within these forums.

I have now finished typing the first half of my post. In the second half, I will clarify what I had meant in my last post.

Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy

I posted a response to this discussion on the means-end dichotomy.

What do I mean when I say "I reject the means-end dichotomy"?

I mean that assuming that "means" and "ends" exist within humans is far too arbitrary. The abstractions of "means" and "ends" does not accurately reflect the human mind.

The means-end dichotomy can have useful applications. It helped us to understand Robinson Crusoe economics of how capital goods originate. Crusoe developed capital goods as a means to further his ends. The means-end dichotomy helped us to understand how producer and consumer goods behave in accord to human desires.

Therefore, the means-end dichotomy functions as an instrumental abstraction. Despite its unsoundness, it helps us to understand economic ideas. Roderick Long has used the term "non-precisive abstraction" to denote a similar idea.

So can we derive instrumental abstractions from science. Can we derive the means-end dichotomy from human psychology? However, we cannot.

We cannot derive instrumental abstractions from science. We can only apply instrumental abstractions to help us understand more complicated ideas. Mises has made a mistake of trying to derive instrumental abstractions from science.

For example, take Mises' argument for mythological individualism. Mises performed an ontological argument for methodological individualism. He said that "collectives do not exist, only individuals exist." He actually derived this instrumental abstraction.

However, in the social sciences, methodological individualism helps us understand social behavior with more precision. Because methodological individualism focuses on the individual to observe social trends, it has more precision than, say, examining social behavior by countries. Saying that "Germany attacked France" goes against methodological individualism, because it observes social behavior as countries instead of its constituent individuals.

However, as we emphasized, we cannot derive methodological individualism by making the ontological arguments. We can only justify methodological individualism for its practical application to help us understand social behavior with more precision.

We will discuss another mistake by Mises on instrumental abstractions. Mises derived ordinal value from science. He cannot do this. He can only justify ordinal value for its practical application.

We will list some practical applications of ordinal value over cardinal value in helping to understand the free price system:

• The simplicity of ordinal value transgressing the overcomplicated numerical calculations of cardinal value.
• A sound understanding of the behavior of the free price system does not require cardinal value.

Mises claimed the "impossibility" of cardinal value. This seems correct to some extent, because the human brain does not store utility in cardinal numbers. However, we could still implement cardinal value in economics. We can "numericalize" cardinal values by measuring pleasure experienced by neurons in the human brain and then converting it to some unit. Just like how we measure temperature by a thermometer. But we deny this, not because of its "impossibility", but of the two advantages of ordinal value over cardinal value: its simplicity and unnecessity.

We have demonstrated that ontological arguments such as "collectives do not exist" or "cardinal value does not exist" are irrelevant in the justification of instrumental abstractions. Mises could have truncated his ontological arguments in Human Action, while still making his book through and logical, or even better, because it's shorter. He could have explained that methodological individualism offers more precision in examining human behavior, instead of the ontological argument that "collectives do not exist." He could have explained that ordinal value offers more simplicity and the unnecessity of numerical calculations of cardinal value, instead of the ontological argument that "cardinal value does not exist." The incorporation of ontological arguments and the exclusion of precision arguments are one of the major mistakes in Human Actions.

Ontological arguments, besides its unnecessity, are even flawed in justifying instrumental values. To a certain degree, "collectives do exist". To a certain degree, "cardinal value does exist" (as shown by the neuron-thermometer example). Mises falsely assumed that the "existence" of an entity requires the unanimous existence in all contexts with perfect accuracy.

What about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot just assume "means" and "ends" and then apply it into any economic or ethical system without justifying it by precision arguments to understanding it. It is far too arbitrary to incorporate that "means" and "ends" into an ethical system just because these two words exist in the English language. Roderick Long extends the precision by splitting "means" into "constitutive means" and "instrumental means."

However, we could extend the precision further by replacing the two words "means" and "ends" with another set of words related to cognitive psychology. Instead of "means" and "ends", we could use "desires", "instincts", "habits", and "reflexes". Those four terms increase the precision further, instead of two under the means-end dichotomy. If interpreted under the means-end dichotomy, "habits" can sometimes be a means and sometimes be an end, and sometimes both. "Desires" can sometimes be a means because desires can change, and sometimes be and end in itself. While the means-ends dichotomy disregards and "desires" and "reflexes", cognitive psychology increases its precision further.

The means-end dichotomy is arbitrary because it disregards the precision, and oversimplifies them into means and ends. While Roderick Long and some Aristolean liberals improves upon it by either splitting "means" into "constitutive means" and "instrumental means," or, as in Aristotelian ethics, an "ultimate end to life". However, Aristotelian liberalism still has less precision than grounding ethics with cognitive psychology.

Ambiguous Ethical Terminology

Roderick Long has written his argument for "natural law". We should first note that the term "natural law" has multiple definitions. Even Long himself confused the definitions.

Now we can see where Rollins' critique has gone wrong. Rollins is thinking of natural rights as if they were a special kind of legal right — a right legislated by God or Nature rather than by the state. Given that assumption, what he says makes sense: legal rights are of little value unless they are also de facto rights. (When Rollins refers to "real rights" as "those rights actually conferred and enforced by the laws of a State or the customs of a social group," he clearly has in mind de facto rights.) Just as it does me no good to have a legal right on paper that the state pays lip service to in theory but systematically ignores in practice, so it does me no good to have a natural right inscribed in the Law of Nature if no one is willing or able to enforce that right.

But this is the wrong way to think about natural rights. A natural right isn't a legal right, it's a normative right. To claim that natural rights don't protect anything is to miss the point; natural rights are supposed to receive protection, not to provide it. Likewise, the function of Natural Law is not to protect any claims, but rather to tell us which claims deserve protection. As normative concepts, natural rights provide guidance for people's conduct. Blaming natural rights for not protecting us is like blaming a cookbook for not making dinner. Cookbooks don't make dinner for us; their purpose is to teach us how to make dinner for ourselves. Likewise, Natural Law doesn't lead our lives for us; its purpose is to guide us in the living of our own lives.3

Long here wins the first argument.

However, Long had used a different definition of "natural rights" than what Rothbard uses. In addition, he has conflated "natural rights" and "natural law," which could mean two distinct topics.

A user named "wilderness" at the Mises Community has made the same mistake.

Taken to the further extreme it's why some can't figure out why protecting somebody's natural rights is in each individuals best interest. It's why somebody comes along and states, they "don't give a damn about liberty"... it's sickening. And why they can't understand murder, rape, and theft is not helpful. Secondly, cause of somebody like Rollins who is really confused.

Wilderness has conflated the "natural rights" written in the U.S. Constitution with the "natural law" of Rothbard.

Rollins is more willing than most critics of Natural Law to face the logical consequences of his position. But if morality is merely a tool for manipulating other people into doing what one wants, one wonders why people ever wrestle privately with moral dilemmas, why they ever find themselves compelled by conscience to do something that is unwelcome not only to themselves but to those around them.

More importantly, though, the question is why we should accept Rollins' claim that nothing is right or wrong and nothing is entitled to reverence. These are extraordinary claims, claims that run contrary to our ordinary beliefs and practices, and so the burden of proof rests with the person making such claims.

Long used a different definition of 'morality' than Rollins. Rollins does not reject 'morality' in the sense what Long uses. Therefore, Long made a strawman argument.

Long argues this from the "performative contradiction." Some self-identified "objectivists" use performative contradiction argument to criticize "subjectivism." They argue that "subjectivists believe that everything originate from subjective preference, but deny subjectivism itself as a subjective preference." However, the self-identified "objectivists" use a different definition of "subjectivism" than what the self-identified "subjecitivists" themselves do. The self-identified "subjectivists" could refute that argument by showing that each side uses a different definition of "subjective." They use the term "subjective" to mean beliefs and values in the mind.

Although we should not reject the "performative contradiction" as a valid argument, the performative contradiction argument has potential flaws. Its flaws stem from the soundness of its premises. The soundness of a performative contradiction argument depends on the soundness of its premises.

Some examples of performative contradiction arguments:

• It is self-contradictory to reject the Aristotelian laws of identity, the excluded middle, and non-contradiction.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ludwig von Mises' law of human action.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ludwig von Mises' psychological egoism.
• It is self-contradictory to reject "cogito, ergo sum."
• It is self-contradictory to reject Murray Rothbard's argument for self-ownership.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Hans-Hermann Hoppe's argumentation ethics.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Stephen Kinsella's estoppel argument.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Stefan Molyneux's universally preferable behavior.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ayn Rand's, Douglas Rasmussen's, and Douglas Den Uyl's attempts to derive "ought" from "is."

Long conflated five different definitions of "amoralism."

In the moral case, for example, Rollins, a self-proclaimed "amoralist," chooses to hold on to what most would view as a highly implausible belief — the belief that there is nothing wrong with "murder, rape, robbery, or torturing children" — and to reject more plausible beliefs whenever they come into conflict with that one.

The first definition of "amoralism" signifies the descriptive notion that "rights do not tangibly exist." In the second sense, the term "amoralism" functions as a mere synonym for "quasi-realism" or "moral fictionalism." The third sense signifies the notion that using terms such as "right" and "wrong" in describing ethical commands can create conflicts between the interpretation of rights and grey areas. In the fourth sense "amoralism" signifies that "I do not feel any empathy for others. Therefore, I want to legalize rape and murder." The fifth sense of "amoralism" signifies irrelevant to morality, for example, "science is amoral because it does not deal with normative opinions."

Rollins probably used "amoralism" in the third sense, while Long probably used "amoralism" in the fourth sense.

We may think of our evolutionarily-implanted normative impulses as playing a role in moral reasoning analogous to the role that sensory experience plays in scientific reasoning. The data of the senses are one of the most important sources of our beliefs about how the universe works. But we are not confined to the sensory level. Our capacity for reason drives us to try to build up a conceptual picture of the universe that makes sense; and although we rely heavily on sensory data in building that picture, if we have to sacrifice some sensory data in order to achieve a scientific picture that makes a little more sense — if we have to decide that, despite initial appearances, the earth isn't flat, the sun doesn't circle it, and tables aren't continuously solid all the way down — then some of what the senses tell us may have to be scrapped for the sake of a more intellectually satisfying theory.

Long has used confusing terms such as "sensation," "perception," and "conception." He then equivocates "evolutionarily-implanted normative impulse" with the "sensory level." He has failed to define these three terms.

Likewise, our evolutionarily-implanted moral impulses are one of the most important sources of our beliefs about how we ought to live. But we are not confined to the instinctual level. Our capacity for reason drives us to try to build up a conceptual picture of right and wrong that makes sense; and although we rely heavily on innate impulses in building that picture, if we have to disregard some of our innate impulses in order to achieve a moral picture that makes a little more sense — if we have to decide that, despite our initial impulses, we shouldn't kill animals for food — then some of what our moral instincts tell us may have to be scrapped for the sake of a more intellectually satisfying ethic. Once again, a purely evolutionary account of our sense of morality, however illuminating, will be importantly incomplete.

Long presupposes a dichotomy between "innate impulse" and "reason." He then equivocates "innate impulse" with "evolutionarily-implanted normative impulse." I believe that Long has used a strawman argument against Rich Hammer. Hammer does not want to abolish "ethical reasoning" altogether in place of "evolutionarily-implanted normative instincts." If Hammer however wanted to abolish "ethical reasoning" altogether, then he would not have written his book.

This article is yet another example of how terminological differences can create chaos. Just imagine if we had resolved all of our terminological differences...

Psychological Egoism = Psychological Atomism

This is previously posted on the Ludwig von Mises forums.

It is arbitrary to label the brain as "egoistic" when the components of the brain are not. Likewise, it is absurd to label the brain as "egoistic" when composites of the "whole brain" are not.

Let us look into this. Assume that the human brain is divided into parts or modules. Each part functions independently with each other. However, they often conflict with each other.

Let us imagine a brain with three parts. One part of the brain, called area-A, deals with the maximization of pleasure. Another part of the brain, called area-B, deals with the maximization of acquiring wealth. Another part, area-C, deals with the minimization of pain.

How do they function? Area-A tries to maximize pleasure when area-C tries to minimize pain. They conflict with each other: does area-A want more pain at the tradeoff of more pleasure, or vice versa? Does area-A want desire short-term pleasure at the expense of long-term pain of area-C? How much pleasure and pain should each of these areas settle?

How does area-A and area-C resolve those conflicts? Area-A sometimes have to sacrifice pleasure for less pain in area-C. Area-C may have to increase pain threadhold for area-A to gain long-term pleasure in the future. All these actions involves area-A or area-C sacrificing with each other. Area-C may sometimes altruistically benefit area-A, and sometimes area-C may be altruistic to area-A.

Should we say that area-A and area-C behave in their own interests, or they collectively interact for the greater interest to "maximize" the "whole brain," the composite satisfaction of area-A, area-B, and area-C?

The question is that the interactions between the three components are selfish or the component parts -- areas-A, area-B, and area-C -- are each selfish but altruistic relative to the composite brain combined?

Let us look at the family.

We will use a metaphor of brain parts to represent family members. One part of the brain, called area-A, represents the mother. Another part represents, called area-B, represets the father. The third part represents, called area-C, represents the child.

The family members help each other. Each family member help one another when one is sick. Each help one another on housework. Why do all three family members help one another? Because they have an innate instinct to help each family member. Humans have evolved an instinct to help their kins. Therefore, can we describe the whole family as based on "self-interest"?

Each person is interconnected with one another in the form of an instinct to help each kin, for the greater benefit of the family. Similarly, each part of the brain conflict with each other, for the greater benefit of the aggregate brain.

Psychological egoists describe each family member as "egoistic" even when they help one another. This seems intuitively correct. However, could we say that each of the three parts of the brain are egoistic themselves, just like what each family member are?

Likewise, could we describe the aggregate "whole brain" is overall egoistic? Psychological egoists would tend to agree. But could we describe the family collectively itself as egoistic? Psychological egoists may intuitively disagree.

Each of the three brain components conflict and compromise with each other, producing an overall equilibrium. Similarly, each family member may conflict and compromise with each other, producing an overall equilibrium. Could we say that the overall equlibrium is "egoistic"? Could we say that the aggregates of the three components are as egoistic as the aggregates of the three family members?

Why do psychological egoists arbitrarily pick the brain as "egoistic," while the family member as a whole as not "egoistic"? This is very arbitrary.

One may object that the best level is to pick the individual brain, instead of groups more than one person. They claim that is is more accurate to analyze action on the individual level rather than the group level. They practice methodological individualism.

However, picking the "whole brain" as the starting point of egoism is very arbitrary. Why do psychological egoists deny that "the family as a whole" as not egoistic but assert that "the brain as a whole" as egoistic? All parts in these two interact, conflict, and compromise with each other, right?

Ex Post Facto Rationalizations in Ethics

Below is a full reply to Cork's post on abortion:

The legitimacy of abortion should have nothing to do with your interpretation of the non-aggression and the proportionality principle. The non-aggression principle can have potentially arbitrary interpretations.

As you know, not all self-described "libertarian anarchists" hold the same views. For instance, some libertarians support animal rights, some oppose abortion, some criticize retributive punishment, and some others support some parental authority. Those views conflict and compete with one another to attract attention.

As we have said previously, one could interpret the non-aggression principle in about a gazillion ways. Some anti-abortionists might feel cognitive dissonance, and thus interpret abortion as a form of aggression. Likewise, some others may interpret retributive punishment as a form of invasion against the criminal. Let us recall the problems of interpreting the non-aggression principle.

Does does the "non-aggression principle" allow "right to self-defense" or the "right to violently punish others"? Does the "non-aggression principle" allow trespassing or hate speech? We will show that the term "aggression" is highly vague.

Some will define "aggression" as "the initiation of physical violence." However, the term physical violence is also vague. Does "physical violence" include noise pollution? Does it include perceived threats of violence? Does "physical violence" include fraud? Whether noise pollution, threats of violence, and fraud are "physical violence" still begs the question.

Libertarians usually defend the right for broadcasters to homestead radio frequencies. However, if a malicious broadcaster "trespasses" another broadcaster's radio frequency, can we label this as "physical violence"? Obviously, the criminal changed nothing physical or tangible. This, also, begs the question whether if we should consider it as "physical violence." This same argument applies with the ownership of domain names.

Consequentially, it begs the question to ask whether anti-defamation laws violate the non-aggression principle. It also begs the question to ask whether the prohibition of nuclear weapons violate the non-aggression principle. In addition, it begs the question to ask whether ordering carbon dioxide polluters to pay restitution violates the non-aggression principle.

Libertarians define "individual sovereignty" as a state in which no one commits aggression against any individual. So far so good.

However, as we recall above, the word "aggression" has arbitrary interpretations. As a result, "individual sovereignty," which depends on the definition of "aggression," also has arbitrary interpretations. I found your usage of "self-ownership" in you elucidation above, therefore, as problematic.

As a consequence, we should only establish the definition of "libertarianism," "non-aggression principle," and "self-ownership" only prototypically. By "prototypically" we meant the prototype theory of classification. Libertarianism does not have any clear-cut "essence," and so does not "aggression" and "personal sovereignty."

Let us take abortion as an example of the arbitrariness of law.

The genuine causes of the abortion controversy arise from religion, empathy, and the definition of life.

Referring to the non-aggression principle constitutes as a type of cognitive dissonance. Judges, for example, use the law to legitimize their evil decrees. They have the power to interpret the law in any biased way, even though the law appears "objective" to the general population.

Legitimizing morality in the name of "it confirms/violates the non-aggression principle" is an appeal to the rule of law. It does not state any reason of the immorality itself, but an appeal to the law of non-aggression. It also begs the question if specific acts violate the non-aggression principle.

"Unborn babies" are parasites and if the mother does not want one in her body, she should not be forced to support one.

I have an objection. It depends on your definition of "parasite."

Aging can also be considered a parasite. So does cancer. If cancer is a parasite, does it give any right for the patient to steal money from a rich person for his treatment? It is a type of theft against the rich person.

Anti-abortionists consider fetuses as living beings. Like the cancer patent, the mother does not have any right to murder against another person, the fetus.

However, I do not oppose abortion. I am making a point that the non-aggression principle and laws can have potentially arbitrary interpretations, and could possibly justify any evil behavior.

The reason the cancer patient should not be allowed to steal from a "rich person" is because the rich person is *not* the parasite.

That is a common objection, but it still depends on the your interpretation of "parasite."

You agree that life is more valuable than property. The rich person can be interpreted as a kind of "parasite" you allow the person to be rich at the expense of killing someone. The rich person could just donate his money on the condition that the mother does not abort the child. So the rich person is causing the mother the kill her child by not donating to the mother. Therefore, you are valuing the rich person's property greater that you value the fetus's life. You do not support subsidizing the mother giving birth instead of aborting her child.

The law forbids murder and rape. Therefore, the would-be murderers and the would-be rapists cannot satisfy their preferences. The would-be victims of murder and rape are technically "parasites" in a sense, because we our preferences for life and against rape are brought about the expense of the preferences of the murderers and rapists. The victims of rape and murder are parasites in a sense and the murderers and rapists are the "victims" in a sense.

So do laws that forbid petty crimes such as adultery. Suppose a wife has cheated on her husband with another man. The wife, here, can both be a victim and a predator. She is a "victim" of the in the sense that the anti-adultery law does not grant her the liberty to cheat on her husband, then punished for it. She is an predator in a sense since she violated the adultery law and that she has angered her husband.

So the rich person can technically be interpreted as a parasite, in a sense. The enforcement of property rights have positive effects on the intelligent and the productive people, at the expense of the unproductive, the lazy, and the dim-witted people. Since the rich person is rich because of property rights, he is a parasite to the poor people. And, because, the enforcement of "property rights" is just a law that makes some more productive at the expense of others, it can form parasites and the exploited: The enforcement of property rights exploit the mentally incompetent, the disabled people, and the unproductive people.

The rich person is a parasite to the fetus in a way that the rich is not subsidizing the mother on the condition that the mother will not abort the fetus.

My point is that the rich person can be interpreted as a "parasite" in a sense, depending on one's self-knowledge. But we have to go back to my original point is that it is circular reasoning to justify laws from the non-aggression principle. It begs the question.

Anti-murder laws restrain the would-be murderer's liberty at the expense of the would-be victim's liberty to be alive. Anti-adultery laws retrain the would-be cheater's liberty at the expense of the spouse's liberty to not be cheated. Property laws restrain the disabled, lazy, mentally incompetent, and the unproductive's liberty at the expense of the liberty of the productive, efficient, and intelligent to create wealth. Pro-abortion laws restrain the fetus's liberty to stay alive at the expense of the rich person's willingness to not donate money to the pregnant mother.

Those who violate the non-aggression principle are labelled parasites, predators, aggressors, or criminals. Those who have experienced a violation of the non-aggression principle are called the victims, the prey, the exploited.

So terms such as "parasite," "predator," "aggressor," "tortfeasor," "criminal," "victim," and "prey" depend on one's definition or interpretation of the non-aggression principle or the law. These terms have different meanings according to one's perspective to the law.

Even libertarians themselves have different meanings for these terms. Some libertarians oppose retributive punishment, some oppose abortion, and some support animal rights. They therefore, have different interpretations of the words such as "parasite," "predator," and "victim." Your argument for abortion is like telling a libertarian who supports animal rights that the abused animals are not the "victims" of human "predators." Since they hold a differing interpretation of "aggression," your usage of these terms are circular, and might never influence them.

This is the reason why your sophistic arguments do not work. What we should be really debating with the anti-abortionists is religion and what constitutes human life.

Here's an example of natural law:

1. Each and every individual should enjoy the full product of his labor. No one else other than the individual can accurately estimate cost of labor that he has worked to produce a good. Therefore, no one else can exchange his good with another good or take his good without the individual's permission because the cost labor he has put into producing the good may be more than others may have perceived. Exchanging a good without consent should be forbidden because the individual may lose some fruits of his labor due to the fact that others may underestimate how much labor one worked to produce that good.
2. If both parties agree to exchange, the exchange is voluntary. Each individual can accurately estimate how much labor he has worked to produce his respective good. Each individual can also estimate the usability of his traders' goods. Therefore, both would maintain their full products of their labor, plus the value each benefited from the exchange.

Organizational Structures in Market Anarchism

Peter G. Klein has written a new criticism to the "left-libertarians" on organization theory. Both Klein and the "left-libertarians" have made some errors. We will identify some problems with the arguments pointed out by both sides below.

Klein, who cited Rothbard as a source, may have performed the argument to authority. Klein used Rothbard's "critique" of agorism, to exploit Rothbard's overwhelming popularity within libertarianism, to push his point-of-view. However, Rothbard, in his critique, entirely strawmanned Konkin's agorism.

Rothbard, in the first portion of his article, misinterpreted Konkin's objections to voluntary corporations and joint stock companies. Rothbard thought that Konkin wants to aggressively forbid the development of these organizations. Rothbard misinterpreted the statement "Konkin opposes wage labor."

Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella, and Murray Rothbard use and interpret the word "oppose" to mean that they oppose actions that violates merely the non-aggression principle.

However, the Aristotelian liberals, such as Roderick Long, defines morality differently. Aristotelian liberalism, which simply denotes a brand of market anarchism that preaches virtue ethics, defines "morality" as a broader system beyond the meta-normative conception of rights. The term "morality," in this sense, can imply voluntary ethical systems that does not necessary coincide with the non-aggression principle. When an Aristotelian liberal says that he "oppose something," he might actually mean that he want to voluntarily persuade others to avoid doing that thing. Likewise, when Roderick Long says that he "morally opposes wage labor," he actually meant to voluntarily advocate alternative arrangements besides wage labor. Long made a similar claim in his libertarian feminism article. When Long said that he "morally oppose prostitution," he actually meant that he wanted to voluntarily abolish prostitution by persuading prostitutes to look for alternative occupations.^[1]

We should not use the term "corporation" due to its vagueness. Often, people conflate the term "corporation" in its legitimate sense and "corporation" in the illegitimate sense. In its illegitimate sense, the term "corporation" signifies state privilege; and "corporation" its legitimate sense signifies an orgazation with limited liability contracts with explicit consent by all parties. This terminological barrier confuses the whole debate.^[2]

In addition, a "corporation" could mean a network of independent contractors,^[3] to borrow this phrase from Peter G. Klein. One could conceptualize this by imagining independent contractors as employees. Even in the real world, we find it hard to distinguish an independent contractor from an employee in the legal sense. Some might define the two terms as the degree of boss control, but we cannot find any strict distinction between independent contractor and employee. How much boss control, specifically, would make the worker an employee instead of an independent contractor? Because we cannot indentify the essential characterists of independent contractors from employment, some would denote these two terms as synonymous.

The term "firm," like "corporation," also has a fuzzy denotation. A firm, for example, could mean a loose association of smaller firms. A firm could also man a cartel agreement among competing sub-firms, or a "business trust." Could we label a joint venture itself a firm even that it comprises of two smaller firms? If we go further with this, we could even label each "independent contractor" as a firm. One could simply imagine an independent contractor as a firm that associates with another firm that pays for its services. The arbitrariness of the term "firm" makes it hard for some to decode its meaning in certain contexts, such as the size of the firm in a free market. We cannot make a valid argument that the median firm will employ less workers in a free market, because of the vagueness of the term "firm."

However, I understand the gist of what the "left-libertarians" mean when they talk about "smaller firms" in a free market. We can rephrase this ideas to this:

Workers will have greater control over his workplace, instead of the CEOs and senior managers monopolizing control; management will be delegated to more specialized workers instead of unspecialized CEOs and senior managers; power will be distributed more evenly among the workplace; workers will have more freedom from boss commands

Obviously, I criticize the second half of Rothbard's article in defense of the reformist political process. Rothbard's critique of the U.S. Libertarian Party seems to not understand that Konkin opposes them on strategical grounds, not merely on meta-normative grounds.

Overall, Rothbard's wrote his article in an extremely legalistic tone. First, Rothbard strawmanned Konkin that he wants to illegalize corporations and wage labor. Secondly, Rothbard strawmanned agorists for their alleged belief them illegalizing the U.S. Libertarian Party and illegitimacy of voting. Even in an agoristic point-of-view, agorists do not want to illegalize either one of them. Agorists do meant "immoral" by "illegal."

When the agorists label corporations and hierarchy as "immoral," they do not mean that they want to prohibit them. They mean by a prediction that workers will find a lesser degree of hierarchy in a free market. The agorists also label "voting" as "immoral" because they consider voting as strategically counterproductive.

Rothbard, in a paragraph, uses over-systematized nonsense to defend the right for slaves to vote:

Let's put it this way: Suppose we were slaves in the Old South, and that for some reason, each plantation had a system where the slaves were allowed to choose every four years between two alternative masters. Would it be evil, and sanctioning slavery, to participate in such a choice? Suppose one master was a monster who systematically tortured all the slaves, while the other one was kindly, enforced almost no work rules, freed one slave a year, or whatever. It would seem to me not only not aggression to vote for the kinder master but idiotic if we failed to do so. Of course, there might well be circumstances — say when both masters are similar — where the slaves would be better off not voting in order to make a visible protest — but this is a tactical not a moral consideration. Voting would not be evil but, in such a case, less effective than the protest.

Rothbard therefore strawmanned the agorists. Like Rothbard, the agorists also defened the right to vote. However, the agorists oppose voting on strategic grounds. Aside from the deontological moral arguments against voting, agorists oppose voting mainly for its impracticality and its bad consequences. Some agorists even have created a moral rule against voting because of its impracticality and its bad consequences.

I see problems with the term "agorism" because of its ambiguity. An "agorist" could mean a Carsonian mutualist who opposes stick ownership of capital and land. That just does not accurately describe my positions.

Setting terminology aside, the term "agorist" has another problem. Some agorists strategically support the black markets and unions. However, I previously described black markets and unions as counterproductive:

Anarcho-capitalists who advocate political reform is functionally a classical liberal, since they do the same thing. Similarly, a market-anarchist who supports syndicalism is functionally an anarcho-syndicalist. An agorist who only sells prohibited drugs is functionally the same to all of the other non-libertarian workers in the black market. Non-straightforward ways of promoting libertarianism are thus highly inefficient.

I emphasized above that grey markets differ from black markets. Grey markets, unlike black markets, can actually work. I support grey markets for its decreased risk.

I also see problems with the term "mutualism." However, that does not imply that I consider the current system as the lesser evil than a mutualist society. Indeed, like most Rothbardian market anarchists, I would rather live in a mutualist society than in any corporatist system, if I had to choose from these two options. Furthermore, if someone opposes the term "mutualism," it does not imply that she opposes allying with the mutualists. Someone can still hold an ardent alliance with the mutualists even if she dislikes to describe herself as a "mutualist."

I have read most of the chapters in Kevin Amos Carson's book Organization Theory. Ninety percent of its chapters deals with empirical "case studies." These "case studies" look redundant and uninteresting. I learned noting new from this book, as I already know the corporate privileges beforehard. Many market anarchists know that there exists significant principal-agent problems in all organizations, such as the oversight costs of employing workers and communication barriers. For proof, I commented about this at Francois Tremblay's blog:

I agree that employment has the principle-agent problem caused from asymmetrical information. I know the significant communication barriers and oversight costs of employing a worker. I also know that in the current system, the employer can give arbitrary orders to the worker whatever the employer feels like it. I agree that in a free society, more independent firms would function.

In a free society, more workers would create independent firms. Instead of the worker agreeing on a contract allowing the employer give arbitrary orders without any extra compensation, the worker owning his or her own firm would have more motivation to innovate instead of doing tedious work that the employer demands. Productivity and innovation would increase and the worker would actually appreciate their work.

I commented the above before Kevin Carson even released his chapter of how productivity and innovation would increase, and oversight costs will decrease under a free market. I commented this on October 7, 2008, but Kevin Carson released his chapter about this on November 2, 2008. Even Stephan Kinsella mentioned the obviousness of these agency costs in all organizations, before Kevin Carson released his chapter.

Therefore I regard Carson's book as a total waste of time. Many other anarcho-capitalists, such as Stephan Kinsella and Peter G. Klein, knew the problems of business organizations without even reading Carson's book.

Furthermore, I carefully noticed the differing definitions of "social hierarchy":

If you define a hierarchy as the criminals above-the-law who defends the state’s existence, I would oppose hierarchies. If you define a hierarchy as any middleman, such as those who transports goods throughout the society, I would support the hierarchies that function voluntarily.

---

[1]

I commented about this at Polycentric Order:

The word "oppose" has multiple meanings. In an article on Libertarian Feminism, Charles W. Johnson and Roderick T. Long "opposed" prostitution. However, they still support the right for individuals to exchange sex for money. They had used "oppose" to mean that they want to voluntarily abolish prostitution, but still support the right to exchange sex for money.

Likewise, when mutualists say that they "oppose wage labor," they do not mean that they oppose the right to create employment contracts. They mean by a prediction that workers will find better ways to make money instead of following the orders of his employer.

[2]

I commented about this at Polycentric Order:

Even though I oppose "corporations" in the sense of state privilege and involuntary limited liability "contracts," I still support "corporations" in the sense of purely voluntary limited liability contracts between two explicitly consenting parties.

[3]

I had previously used the phrase assocation of independent contractors in place of network of indepent contractors at Polycentric Order

you cannot assume that worker cooperatives will have less problems than an association of independent contractors ... Comparatively, democratically-controlled worker cooperatives would have more agency problems than an association of independent contractors.

---

Left-libertarians argue that in a free market, there would be "less" "vertically integrated" firms, partially got that idea from Kevin Carson, and from their logic. However, this is not true.

First, they did not agree to a definition of what a "vertically integrated firm" is. All factories are "vertically integrated firms" because they seperate the production processes to different machines. In this way, vertically integrated firms exist because they are more efficient, and do not have to pay for the cost for transportation, etc.

So, certain types of "vertically integrated firms" are more efficient. However, they also argue that because of our current monopoly of firms, there would be less because competition undermines these inefficient vertically integrated firms. They are using the words "but" in "but there would be less" without thinking about others.

There would be MORE vertically integrated firms and corporations in a free market because there are no barriers to entry to start a corporation or a vertically integrated firm in a free market. So arguing that there would be less "corporations and more private contractors" in a free market is nonsense.

Also, many libertarians argue on blatant geographical assumptions. For example, some left-libertarians argue that everything in anarchism is privatized. However, there could exist unprivatized land and atmosphere. For instance, Hans-Hermann Hoppe defend "immigration reduction" on the assumption that all land and atmosphere is privatized so many people would use them to block transportation. Another example is the belief in collectivist roads from left-libertarians, as they argue because all land is private, there should be some collective transporation to prevent the owners to charge high tolls.

Also, left-libertarians are more sympathetic to anarcho-communists. This is false. Anarcho-communism is a type of collectivist anarchism, where the workers and people collectively own all the means of production. This includes the military. Why would anarcho-communists have respect to the individual when the military is collectively controlled by the workers, just like democracy? Hence, anarcho-communism is a dictatorship by the workers.

---

Limited liability can be specified by contracts, but in the current situation, some limited liability businesses has an advantage over unlimited liability businesses. Suppose a robotic truck driver runs over your property. This cannot be contractually enforced because you did not buy the truck. The owner from the truck driving company cannot get sued, because he has a state-granted limited liability privelage. Therefore, the owner can malinvest by producing more robotic truck drivers regardless of safety to get money. The business, however, is protected by the state.

If you attempt to use PDAs defend against the truck driver in a statist society, you are liable for damaging their property. But in an anarchist society, you can use private defence agencies to offer compensation from the truck company.

However, because our current situation is not a market anarchist society, the trucking business cannot be compensated by PDAs because they are protected by the state. Thus, in some situations, limited liability is a priveladge from the state.

Another thing is their limited liability from intellectual property violations. They have an advantage in making products that violate patents. This is unfair to unlimited liability businesses. But the main problem is the legality of IP laws, which should be eliminated along with the state.

Yes, do not mistake me--some limited liability can be specified by contracts--but some do not and is a priveledge of the state.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Advocates Worker Ownership

If you hear someone yelling the phrase "property is theft," you might intuitively label him as a communist or as an economic collectivist. However, many libertarian bloggers and blog commentators challenge this assumption.

First coined by a 19th century mutualist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, contemporary mutualists and Rothbardian market anarchists continue to repeat this motto. Even that this aphorism sounds absurd at first, they generally claim that Proudhon did not meant "property is theft" in the literal sense; they claim that Proudhon referred it to the property stolen by the state. Therefore, they claim that merely "semantics" caused this terminological conflict. A blogger called "Brainpolice," in a post titled Remembering Proudhon at Polycentric Order, postulated this:

There is also a context in which Proudhon was very much in favor of private or individual property, viewing it as an indispensible [sic] counterweight to the state.

A lot of market anarchists therefore asserted that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon favors property, and that he used "property as theft" as a rhetoric to attract readers. Andrew's post and the commentators at this blog post unanimously cited Brainpolice's assertion without even reading the primary sources.

However, if we take a closer look at what Proudhon meant by "property is theft," Brainpolice got it all wrong. In Proudhon's treatise What is Property?, he advocates the "possession" or the "use-and-occupancy" theory of property. Proudhon, therefore, as he said, rejects sticky property (Lockean property), or the perpetual ownership of property:

So that in society the only thing which could bring back the inequality of labor would be the right of occupancy, -- the right of property. (Page 124)

Therefore, Proudhon used "property is theft" to mean that "sticky property is theft."

Brainpolice probably got this idea from Brad Spangler's post on Proudhon, which Spangler in turn got it from this web page. If Brainpolice took that idea from Spangler, then he certainly did popularize Spangler's claim to misrepresent Proudhon. Brainpolice claimed that Proudhon merely opposes state privileges on property, but advocates sticky property just like how the Rothbardian market anarchists do.

Also, in contrast to the popular opinion, Proudhon actually rejected "the fruits of our labor" as a justification for property. He repeats this position in Chapter 3 of What is Property. Proudhon only justified property by "possession" or use-and-occupancy.

Furthermore, Proudhon used "property is impossible" to mean his theory of primitive accumulation. Proudhon argued that in a society ruled by sticky property, over time, a few hands will eventually concentrate nearly all property. He argued that these proprietors will then rent out their property to serfs. Therefore Proudhon actually used "property is impossible" to mean that "sticky property will lead to feudalism, with the poor propertyless (i.e. impossible for the poor to own property)." Proudhon demonstrated this in Chapter 4 in What is Property:

Every possessor of lands, houses, furniture, machinery, tools, money, &c., who lends a thing for a price exceeding the cost of repairs (the repairs being charged to the lender, and representing products which he exchanges for other products), is guilty of swindling and extortion. In short, all rent received (nominally as damages, but really as payment for a loan) is an act of property, -- a robbery. (Page 167)

Many market anarchists blindly follow Brainpolice's authority for his claims. In the past, Brainpolice, in a comment on his website, dogmatically claimed that Mikhail Bakunin actually uses the phrase "collectivist anarchism"; and that Lysander Spooner and Benjamin R. Tucker actually use the phrase "individualist anarchism" to describe themselves. We have also refuted this. We have dispelled these misconceptions.

How to Spot a Naïve Ancap

We will make a quick post to list some 10 planks to distinguish a naïve ancap from a radical ancap.

Plank one. The naïve ancap estimates that labor productivity will merely double in ancapistan. Contrastingly, the radical ancap believes that ancapistan would have at least five times greater productivity than what we have now. The naïve ancap believes that taxation and inflation more-or-less cause only a 50% productivity loss, while the radical ancap knows that the state squanders at least 80% of our labor productivity.

Plank two. The naïve ancap follows mainstream supply-side celebrities like Ron Paul, Peter Schiff, and/or the conspiracy nut Alex Jones. The naïve ancap almost exclusively focuses on bail-outs, while avoiding all the other draconian privileges that the plutocrats loot from us. Contrastingly, the radical ancap focuses on the entire scope of state privileges, besides taxation. The radical ancap understands that state regulations, interventions, licensing, urban planning, and prohibitions more greatly impoverishes the economy besides merely taxation and inflation.

Plank three. Because the naïve ancap have a less radical view of economics than the radical ancap, they will often resort to a fetish for the past American government, in what they call "Restore the Republic." In doing so, the naïve ancap clungs to the U.S. Constitution, an obsolete document. Likewise, the naïve ancaps more likely vote for the "fiscal conservative" candidates who promises to slash the tax brackets by an only few percentage points. They will often fall into Ron Paul's traditionalist "Campaign for Liberty," the totalitarian "Free State Project," the theocratic "John Birch Society," or "Peter Schiff for Senator."

Plank four. The naïve ancap more likely follows stock market indices than the radical ancap. The stock-market indices, such as the Dow Jones Index, most likely measures the well-being of the most privileged firms. The 30 components of the Dow Jones Index consists of mega-corporations which gets subsidies and bailouts from the government, and regulations that cartelize them.

Plank five. The naïve ancap more likely favors gradualist and reformist polices that compromises the their goal. For example, the naïve ancap more likely praises welfare reform programs, such as FairTax, school vouchers, Health Savings Accounts, and the other of the so-called "market-based" solutions. Contrastingly, the radical ancap recognizes these schemes as simply the government as expanding out to quasi-statist firms.

Plank six. Because the naïve ancap trusts the state more, they will likely hold the status quo of legitimizing some state practices, such as immigration restriction or disallowing the "illegal" immigrants to use the bureaucratic hospitals or the state schools (indoctrination prisons).

Plank seven. The naïve ancap, in general, has greater faith in the state and its bureaucracy than the radical ancaps. We do not mean that the naïve ancap supports or even tolerates statism. We mean that they only believe that bureaucracies have 50% or so inefficiency than the so-called "private" companies. For example, the naïve ancap claims that school vouchers can more efficiently indoctrinate children than state schools. However, the naïve ancap never questions the state indoctrination centers itself. Contrastingly, the radical ancap believes that truly free market schools will have 95% more efficiency, not at indoctrinating children, but at educating them.

Plank eight. The radical ancap views the state as a criminal monster that deceptively steals at least 80% of our productivity, at least not as much as the naïve ancap does. Therefore the naïve ancap will likely vote and participate in electoral campaigns rather than education. Even if the naïve ancap wants to educate others, they will tend to use arguments justifying the status quo of our income distribution as a "natural" outcome of human nature or the economic system. Most of these arguments sound indistinguishable from what Such Limbaugh or Sean Hannity makes, that "tax cuts" benefits the economy, or "welfare" creates a spiral of dependence. They never question the state impoverishes individuals by its licenses, building codes, land-use regulations, red tape, and certification requirements which impoverishes them by wasting 90% of their productivity (the state steals 80% of the productivity from the middle class, but 90% of the productivity from the lower classes).

Plank nine. The naïve ancap will more likely get fooled by the glittering generalities and the vague words spoken by conservative politicians and radio hosts.

Plank ten. The naïve ancap still trusts mainstream media.

The Social Anarchist Assault on Ancapistan

Alex, thanks again for your criticism titled Fallacious Rejection of Anarchism.

First of all, I consistently describe myself as a "poor writer," which means that my writing often misrepresents by beliefs. For instance, I mistyped yesterday's response and it contained grammatical errors, and, as you all know, some misrepresentations. In addition, I forgot to edit, revise, and clarify my work. Therefore I will clarify my claims that I pointed out yesterday.

Alex said: This is a misrepresentation of me. What affiliation with minarchism? I had come to negatively define anarcho-capitalism after having been one myself! ... The claim that I was a minarchist while making such claims about anarcho-capitalism is false - I held the exact same position I do now upon making those claims and considered myself a market anarchist. The allusion to me as a minarchist has nothing to do with this.

Looking at Alex's old blog and his past influence from Ron Paul, I presumed that he had defined "anarcho-capitalism" that way. On his old blog, Alex had defined "anarcho-capitalism" as a system of competing private defense agencies operated by large bureaucratic firms. However, most self-described "anarcho-capitalists" disagree with Alex's narrow definition. These "anarcho-capitalists" define "anarcho-capitalism" more broadly, as a system in which its constituent individuals abide by the non-aggression principle. I hope this clarifies it up.

Alex said: My problem with anarcho-capitalism is in the assumption of a certain absolutist norm of property rights and by making a reductio ad absurdum out of what *some* anarcho-capitalists advocate. ... Anarcho-mercantalist would like to fool people into thinking that all of this is purely a semantic issue when it isn't. ... This is not merel about labels.

I agree with Alex here. I try to minimize my use of "anarcho-capitalism" because of its connotations, especially when I communicate with strangers. In general, as I mentioned before, I dislike to describe myself with one-word, two-word, or three-word labels. I also disagree with with the beliefs that some (or most) of the "anarcho-capitalists" hold. In your quote of me, I meant that some "non-vulgar" market anarchists continue to use "anarcho-capitalism" to label themselves, even if they know that some (or most) of the "anarcho-capitalists" conflate the current system with a free market.

Alex said: it is generally revolved around the concern that "sticky ownership of land" as a normative absolute can justify authoritarianism, have bad socio-economic consequences and ultimately devolve into states. The concerns about anarcho-capitalism are not merely over the term itself.

I know the consequences if we take "sticky" land ownership to the absolute. It might result in some cartelization of land, thus might devolve into a state. Nevertheless, the current system already cartelizes land.

Many "anarcho-capitalists" even favor land redistribution of past stolen land. See Rothbard's article on the Confiscation and the Homestead Principle.

Many mutualists therefore do not see much difference between mutualism and "left-Rothbardianism." However, as I described earlier in an unexpectedly famous post titled The Left-Libertarian Strategy, the "left-Rothbardians" and the mutualists differ by a lot.

Alex said: Some "anarcho-capitalists" likely dislike the term "market anarchism" precisely because it implies that they do not have a monopoly on free market ideas in anarchism. The resistance to "market anarchism" as an umbrella is a reinforcement of my own claim that "anarcho-capitalists" tend to be monocentric.

I only partially agree with you here. Let us clarify this below.

Alex said: I have never taken an absolutist anti-private-property position.

I apologize for misrepresenting you of opposing "private property" in all contexts. Anyway, I identify myself as a "poor and sloppy writer." Also, as you mentioned, I support "voluntary cooperatives" and oppose "corporations" if I follow your definitions.

I consider this sentence that I have written as unclear:

Anarcho-mercantilist said: I think Cork use 'private property' to mean the 'non-aggression principle'

So we will rephrase and clarify the above statement: Cork used "private property" to mean that "no social anarchist has the right to harm the legitimate private property of third parties." I used "legitimate private property" here to refer to the private property legitimately owned by individuals, not stolen property held by a monarch or by the state (which includes taxpayer-funded contractors).

Let us explain what Cork means below.

We find it unquestionable that all social anarchists—regardless of the anarcho-communist, anarcho-syndicalist, or anarcho-collectivist stripe—hate "capitalism" and "wage labor."

Thus, the social anarchists will invade ancapistan and attack their factory bosses, managers, landowners, and financiers—all the occupations that they consider as parasitic. Cork fears about this!

Alex might object to this claim because many social anarchists (such as Bakunin) speak of "voluntary associations." However, the social anarchists have a different conception of what "voluntary" means. As I mentioned before in another comment, the social anarchists define the expropriation of capital and land by the workers as a non-aggressive act. Therefore, because the social anarchists argue the expropriation of capital and land as "voluntary," they will invade ancapistan and attack their factory bosses, managers, landowners, and financiers.

Mike Gogulski (who describes himself as an anarcho-capitalist) has commented his thoughts on the social anarchists in his post titled Agorism and Ancap Panarchy. Mike, in one of his comments, has expressed the same fear that the social anarchists will attack ancapistan.

We hope that this clarifies Cork's thoughts on the social "anarchists."

Anarchist Controversies

I disagree with some aspects of libertarianism promoted by virtually all libertarian bloggers. Thus I unsubscribed to almost all libertarian blogs. I began to criticise libertarianism since then. I took useless notes in hundreds of text files since I felt like it. I felt obsessed with the fallacies. I plan to integrate these notes in some writings. Below, I posted a possible outline of the free online book on libertarian fallacies. Almost all of the materials below did not show on my blog or any other author. So this outline does not repeat any of the fallacious ramblings on this blog.

I integrated 22 separate articles to this book as "chapters." I sorted these chapters so they would build up in order. I might also add 15 additional chapters in the Fallacies within Libertarianism section.

1. The Abuse of Libertarian Theory

   1. The Fallacies of the Rule of Law

      Why do authority figures abuse the rule of law? What incentives does the system lack? Can we even interpret the law clear enough? Indeed, libertarians often refer to the U.S. Constitution and the non-aggression principle as the "rule of law." Politicians use the "rule of law" to legitimize their beliefs. Wikipedia editors, likewise, abuse the "rule of law" for their own interests.

   2. The Abuse of Libertarian Ethics

      Hans-Hermann Hoppe cites the "non-aggression principle" to justify closed borders. Likewise, some misapply the non-aggression principle for their own ends. Indeed, libertarian theorists cram their preferences with the non-aggression principle to promote their own interests.

2. Libertarian Semantics

   3. The Confusing Labels of Libertarian Schools

      We often cannot attach any specific or concrete meaning to the words "liberal," "conservative," "capitalist," and "socialist." Despite such usual words, we also confuse terms such as "anarcho-capitalist." We found a surprising number of definitions of "anarcho-capitalism," from the broad meaning of the non-aggression principle, to the narrow, "hard propertarian" meaning resembling fascism.

   4. Ontological Nonsense

      In ontology, the "study of being," we take different positions on "rationalism," "empiricism," "physicalism," and "idealism." We will show the meaningless of these terms.

   5. The Semantic Abuse of Meta-ethics

      What does "objectivism," "subjectivism," "realism," and "nominalism" mean? Can we agree on a specific meaning of these terms? Can we "pick" a semantic interpretation of ethics such as "cognitivism" and "non-cognitivism"? No, we do not. Some will ignore this chapter as advocating "subjectivism" or "idealism," but we claim to not hold any position in meta-ethics.

   6. The False Dichotomy of Consequentialism and Deontology

      Many libertarians divide between consequentialist and deontological ethics. We will deny this false dichotomy.

   7. E-Prime and Libertarian Semantics

      Libertarians will often misrepresent others. How do we resolve it? Some will resort to redefining terms, while others avoid only those "controversial" terms altogether. We found a new method to do this. We resolve this by practicing a variety of English called E-Prime, which reduces labeling and ontological fallacies.

3. Fallacies within Libertarianism

   8. The Slippery Slope of Lifeboat Scenarios

      Libertarians will often extort aggression in "extreme" cases of ethics as "lifeboat scenarios." However, they will often abuse it and unconciously label "lifeboat situation" to every subject that they repel. Indeed, many controversies orginate from lifeboat scenarios. Thus we will refine "lifeboat situations" to minimize ambiguity.

   9. The Fallacy of Subjective Indeterminacy

      When debating with some statists, we often go into debates on whether we should support the state to fund some "public goods" such as health care and housing. Many libertarians, however, will go into the slippery slope fallacy of "subjective indeterminacy" when debating about "public goods." Even with noting the multiple meanings of this term, we still take the risk of going into a version of the Sorites paradox.

   10. Market Forces and Cultural Preferences do not Mix

       Some will say market competition will increase "popularity." Some others claim that a product can "outcompete" others. However, we should never use the metaphor "competition" to describe social evolution. We often abuse free-market theory with social movements.

   11. The Theory of Popularity and Fringeness

       Why many so many people adore a belief or ideology and ignore others? Why does not the majority of economists practice Austrian Economics? Why typists avoid the Dvorak keyboard layout? We will claim the underlying factors of popularity, and the unpopularity of non-mainstream viewpoints.

   12. Why Do We Grow?

       What does it mean for the economy to grow? Does it mean increased labor productivity or increased use-value satisfaction of its individuals? Should we even consider individual productivity as a virtue? We will conclude "economic growth" as a nonsensical concept.

   13. Free-Market Manorialism: Why We All Rent and Invest Capital

       Some will argue "rent" will decrease, due to increased land availble and lower time-preferenecs. Some will predict land prices to increase, thus labeling the free-market as "manorialistic." However, we will all ubitiquously rent in a free market, whether we like it or not.

   14. The Myth of Regulatory Expansion

       Some net neutrality detractors, such as libertarians, oppose increased interventions on Internet service providers. However, they often oppose it for flawed reasons. Can citizens even restrain the state? Some will say no, and some will argue yes. The Public Choice Fallacy comes.

   15. The Economic-Demographic Myth and Sociobiological Evolution

       Ronald Reagan once claimed the free-market as "the best contraceptive." Ludwig von Mises and Mary Ruwart said the same thing. Should we accept that free markets reduce birth rates? Despite this fad, the opposite actually happens. Free markets increase birth rates, and economic planning reduces it. Also, due to sociobiological evolution, even a socialist society will increase birth rates in the long-run.

   16. The Dow Jones Fallacy

       Libertarian enthusiasts and economists capture stock market indices as a hobby. However, they fail to take account of the accuracy of the reporting. Can the Dow Jones measure the entire economy accurately? The Dow consists of the 30 privileged firms and biases itself on cartelized sectors of the economy. Simply no.

4. Libertarian Traps

   17. The Ubitiquity of Policy Libertarianism

       Even many those libertarians who oppose electoral politics support some form of policy libertarianism, whether criticizing Obama as a person or promoting "welfare reform" as conservatives do.

   18. Obama Will Not Instigate Revival

       Many conservatives and libertarians alike, applaud Obama. They want Obama to mess the economy up so the general population will see socialism, in general, as a failure. However, Obama supporters will not blame socialism in itself, but will blame Obama for "mismanaging" and "bad policies." Just like how the Democrats do not blame Bush for the war, but blame the "mismanagement" or "bad intelligence." They do not criticize the war in itself.

   19. Against Anti-Federalism

       Almost all proponents of libertarianism, including many mutualists, support "states' rights" or defederalization of the federal republic. They will even support "local control of schools and health care" and every other thing.

   20. Radicalism and the Politicial Process

       Politicans fool more libertarians than we know. They will often fool even those who do not practice electoral politics. In the early stages of the campaign, politicians will often lie to attract the radical grassroots first, and then speak in a less and less rhetoric towards the end stages of the campaign.

   21. How Conservatives Deceive Libertarians

       Conservatives often speak of "deregulation," "less spending," and oppose "socialized medicine" that appeals to some libertarians. However, almost all of such terms have multiple meanings.

   22. The Libertarian Case Against Wikipedia

       Often, libertarians will get stuck in a bureaucratic institution called Wikipedia. Not suprisingly, they often get wound up on wasteful debates about changing the article titles, prescribing their own definitions of some libertarian terms, and putting non-mainstream knowledge and links which invites editors to revert. Besides those numerous false sockpuppet convictions, the editors lack many incentives to improve articles and accept contributions from dissidents other than to revert their edits.

Against Information Privacy

I dislike to describe my beliefs with one-word, two-word, or three-word labels. Such labels, which include "libertarian," "anarcho-capitalist," and "agorist," describe belief systems inaccurately and imprecisely. Also, I dislike to describe myself with words that I consider as glittering generalities, such as "individualist." I will therefore describe myself below in a precise and concrete dialect.

To label my belief system more precisely, I believe in total informational freedom and oppose all forms of censorship, informational privacy "rights," and publicity "rights." Such informational privacy "rights" only protect criminals (which includes the state), enhance groupthink, discourage group cohesiveness, encourages dishonesty and free riders, violates the freedom of thought, and contradicts with ethical individualism. And most arguments for informational privacy "rights" rest on the flawed argument that employers would "discriminate" employees. To achieve total informational freedom, I support the re-legalization of defamation, slander, libel, hate speech, blackmail, voyeurism, audio and video recording, eavesdropping, and the banned privacy-destroying technologies.

I posted this because many market anarchists, and self-described "individualists," support some types of censorship.

Against Punishment - Even Nonviolent Punishment

I want to apologize that I misrepresented BrainPolice's position on punishment. I generally agree with his opinion in punishment. I view punishment as a "pragmatic measure to deter crimes that psychopaths plan to commit." While I do regard that the current statist society constantly misapplies punitive measures, I do believe, that even in anarchy, punishment must exist to deter certain crimes. I disagree that boycotts, as promoted by Stephen Molyneux (pages 118-119), stands as an effective measure to deter crime.

I disbelieve in the "indoctrination of children" and the "operant conditioning" pseudoscience promoted by the behaviorist school of psychology. In fact, I oppose punishment more than even the most radical detractors of corporal punishment. I differ from them because I do not only oppose corporal punishment, but I oppose all types of punishment inflicted on children (unless the child psychopathically committed a crime). I view punishment as an irrational act, and it suffers from agent-principle problems. Children can easily avoid being punished from their parents, just like how some drug dealers can avoid being kidnapped by the state.

I do not hold a Freudian view, as in Stephan Molyneux and Danny Shadar, that childhood experiences primarily determine the behaviors in adult life.

Limitations on Self-Defense

In response to BrianPolice's view on self-defense, I posted my view on self-defense below:

Previous posts related to this topic include The Fallacies of Moral Subjectivism and Subjective Property

I will articulate my view below:

Some individuals will use strawman arguments against those who oppose deadly force when trespassing, as "anti-victim" or "anti-defense." They often misinterpret the definition of "punishment," so they will see the libertarian law of proportional punishment as promoting aggression. Too often, they conflate "punishment" with "self-defense." Punishment, however, is defined as the commission of deterrence only after the crime has commissioned; while self-defense is the use of force when a crime is commissioning. Thus, libertarian law does not forbid imposing "unproportional" force in the situation of self-defense.

Detractors of the libertarian law of proportional punishment argue that since value is subjective, no one can accurately determine the "proportional" compensation. However, as we will argue that property boundaries are also subjective, so these arguments presents a straw-man.

The law of proportional punishment can be better rephrased as the compensatory damages should be proportional. The law of proportionality, however, does not give any limit on the amount of punitive damages.

However, whether a "crime" has occurred or not is also subjective, but not to the extent of valuation. For example, if an individual mistakenly recognized one's house as a shopping store; he will come in; but the owner of the house will shoot him in the certain cultural context, if some walks up in the person's yard or walkway; the owner of the house does not have the right to kill him, since in the social context, yard's and walkaways leads to his door, in order to communicate.

Self-defense, unlike punishment, does not follow the proportionality law. The owner has the right to use deadly force against the aggressor; if the aggressor's knows that he is intentionally being mischievous and is harming you.

If the individual knows that he is intentionally being mischievous, and knows the risk that the owner might shoot him; but then aggresses your property anyway; then shooting him is certainly justified.

If an individual places a sign in front of his property that said "all trespassers will be shot," then it is possible that someone might still think that they are permitted to walk up in his walkaway or yard, to communicate with to owner. Individuals who do not know how to read English are more likely to ignore the sign. Even if the warning is very obvious to the common man, what if a colorblind person didn't notice the sign?

But it depends on the intentionally of the aggressor. If an robber uses his unloaded gun against you, the aggressor is clearly being intentional in this situation; so it is justified to shoot him.

However, suppose a random individual who is confused walks in your lawn; the individual might think that he is on commonly-owned property. Thus, the homeowner does not have the right to use deadly force against him.

If someone "breaks in" the house by breaking doors or windows, you clearly have the right to use deadly force; as the aggressor is clearly being intentional, as he destroyed your property.

Suppose you own a house, that has automatic doors, and has large windows that show a large variety of goods inside it. With both of these, your house displays the common features of a shopping store. Many individuals who look at your house would, according to the appearence, confuse your house with a shopping store. If the "shoppers" go inside your house planning to buy stuff; you do not have the right to shoot them; because the look and feel of your house resembles too much like a shopping store, thus displaying an "implicit contract" granting any individuals to enter.

Thus, it is too subjective if such "implicit contract" allowing individuals to enter exists. Suppose an individual grows up in a different culture that permits individuals to step on your front yard. When he moves to a different society with a different culture that does not tolerate anyone walking on the front yard, he will likely be shot. Suppose an individual that does not know English misinterprets your building as some public resort so he enters. He, too, will likely be shot.

Thus, we have proved that property boundaries may potentially have subjective interpretations.

Everyone has the right to self-ownership. Thus everyone has the right to die. So if an individual enter's another property and assumes that the risk that the homeowner will shoot him at self-defense, the homeowner can shoot. But due to vague property boundaries, no one can be sure if the individual is behaving mischievously.

So we will have a "common law" that establishes and objectively defines these boundaries.

We will have different arbitrators, because due to cultural and social differences, not all arbitrators are typically suited to judge within different cultural standards of aggression. For example, if some cultures define "hate speech" as a form of aggression, and some other cultures that that does not consider it as aggressive; different societies will construct different variants of common law that defines specific cases such as "hate speech" as aggressive or not.

Different versions of common law will define the "implicit contract" of the shopping store, as exemplified above. This will deter the arbitrary interpretation of subjective interpretations of aggression, thus will make individuals have greater confidence.

For example, if the common law approves the use of deadly force against merely trespassers walking on the front yard, then very few people will walk outside, in the fear that they will unintentionally step on someone's property and the owners will use deadly force against them. Therefore, a common law system will spring up in anarchy that forbids deadly force, in the case of trespassing when no greater threats or aggression is involved, to make people less worried of unintentionally stepping another's property.

Let us assume that a contract exists between the store owner and a shopper that permits the store owner to use of any force, or, in different case, if the aggressor fully knows that he is behaving aggressively, and he clearly understood that he will have risk if the crime has commissioned. Thus, following this logic, the store owner can legitimately use deadly force against individual who steals bubble gum, if the robber clearly knows that he will be facing serious consequences including being shot. However, too often the bubble gum theft occurs unintentionally, thus it will likely increase fear, and might make some avoid shopping in stores anymore. Also, it might be the case that the shopper brought his own gum to the store, so the store owner might mistakenly confuse their bubble gum with his. This will further instill fear, so individuals will likely avoid doing any action that might be misinterpreted by others.

A solution to these problems implying risk is to propose a common law specifying the property boundaries, the legitimate amounts of force in each given situation, and the agreeing in the amount of compensation in the event of property torts. Without common law defining, or "de-subjectifying" the values of various goods, proportional compensation and punishment is not possible. Common law is the solution to objectively definine the boundaries, the cultures (see the walkway example) and standards to judge the "implicit contract," so individuals will not be subject to various interpretations of boundaries and rules defining fraud. In addition, because the individual voluntarily agrees on a legal system that they chose themselves, this will solve the cultural problems and will not confuse the non-English speakers. At last, the legal system in an ararchic society will be competitive, and the individual may choose to live in societies enforcing any laws as he wishes.

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The distinction between property damage and no property damage cannot be justified. The value of property and coercion is valued subjectively. Thus, it is impossible to objectively tell whether property damage has occurred.

Some people would consider that flying an airplane above some land is coercion and some would consider air pollution damage.

Suppose if one throws away some stuff that "looks" useless. However, the owner of the product have the knowledge of it, thus have the ability to estimate the value. The owner of the product sees it as highly valuable. Thus, that would cause conflict.

If an owner decides to leave a highly valued object outside, he is implicitly accpeting the risk of some person in a parachute landing there, some bird landing there or some airplane crashing in the object. Thus, the best way to prevent conflict is to protect the object, such as building a wall or moving it inside a house. Since value is subjectivly, it is very important to protect some objects that is subjectively valued important. Otherwise, the court might value the object lesser.

Another effect of applying this logic is proportional punishment. If a parachuter lands on the important object and breaks it, he does not deserve to die. Instead, he should offer compensation. Anyway, the owner of the object is implicitly accpeting the risks that are more likely to happen such as birds and crashing airplanes.

But if the owner puts the object inside a building or builds a wall, the intruder deserves much more servere punishment for breaking in.

Humans assume many biases, such as the assumption that every person owns the space directly above the land. However, this is false. One can fly airplanes or build houses that overlap them. These are legitimate only if they are not directly damaging property. But due to subjectivity, there is no clear line to define.

Suppose one surrounds a fence around someone's house to block them so they can starve to death. This is illegitimate sometimes and sometimes legitimate.

So commonly-agreed laws would form in an anarchist society to prevent such things. Voluntary associations would form to prevent them.