How to Really Overcome Procrastination

Increase the Pain of Accessing Irrelevant Tasks

A lot of blogs give tips on how to increase productivity. However, most of them are ill-written and inaccurate. But, more importantly, no one has given a theory behind procrastination.

Let us start with the theory of how humans appraise decisions. Suppose that you want to eat a pizza. However, you discovered that it takes twenty minutes to drive to the pizza store. What would you feel? You will probably refuse to buy the pizza. However, if the time was shorter, then you might choose to drive to the store. The shorter the time, the more likely you will choose to purchase a pizza.

Let us say that the pizza increases your pleasure. Let us say that driving to the store increases your pain. So, to put it more abstractly, the greater the ratio of pleasure to pain, the more likely you will make a decision.

This has some practical applications in overcoming procrastination. You could simply increase the pain to prevent making those decisions. For example, if you want to quit watching television. However, it is likely that you will watch it in the future, unless you throw out the television. Throwing out the television will increase the pain of driving to the store to buy another television. Therefore, this increased pain will reduce your likelihood of purchasing a new television. This is similar to the pizza example.

If the television is right in front of you, it would be very easy for to resume your procrastination. But throwing it out would make it harder to access. You wouldn't want to drive to the electronic store in order to watch television. Compared to the difficulty of driving to the store, you might be more likely to be motivated by completing your main task instead of procrastinating.

Suppose you want to reduce your Internet browsing to increase productivity. However, at times, you will procrastinate and resume your browsing. As shown above, a solution to reduce your Internet browsing is to unplug the Internet cable. This will increases your pain of re-plugging it that you will less likely procrastinate.

Decrease the Pain of Accessing Your Main Task

Another aspect of this is that you can reduce procrastination by decreasing the pain to access your productive tasks. For example, if you want to be more productive, such as eating healthy foods more often, you might want to make these foods easy to access. The more you can easily access these foods, the more likely you will decide those foods compared to the harder-to-access foods.

Another aspect, as shown above, is to make the unhealthy foods harder to access.

Assume that you are a writer, and you have to finish some writing project stored in some text files in a folder. Suppose you already have unplugged your Internet cables, thrown out your television. But even though you increased the pain of accessing the irrelevant tasks, you still are not motivated to increase your productivity. You still procrastinate. An additional technique to decrease procrastination is to create shortcuts to your writing folder and shortcuts to your text files on the desktop. In this way, you it would be easier to access. As said above, the easier to access, the more likely you will choose this.

The main point in decreasing procrastination is to increase your difficulty of accessing irrelevant tasks and to decrease the difficulty of accessing your tasks you want to accomplish.

This has indeed increased my productivity by several times.

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Illegal Contraband, Raw Milk! Farmers Arrested, Wake Up America

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Flaws Within the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator

The Myers-Briggs type indicator is a test which classifies one's personality into sixteen distinct types. The sixteen personality types are formed by a combination of four dimensions:

• Introversion/Extroversion
• Sensation/Intuition
• Thinking/Feeling
• Perceiving/Judging

These scales are very rigid and arbitrary.

Vague Tests

Some online tests that find one's personality by offering questions are very vague. For example, in the similarminds.com test, there are ambiguous words such as "abstract" and "order," "abstract" vs. "concrete," and "outgoing" vs. "reserved," and "feel" vs. "think." Test takers do not know how "abstract" or "concrete." The tests failed to qualify the scales.

Another flaw is the emotion/thinking scale - the first reason is that emotions require thinking and vice versa, the second reason is that someone can have both emotion and thinking and someone can lack both emotion (empathy) and thinking.

This represents stereotypes such as Simon Cowell who lacks empathy and Anthony Robbins who have much empathy and intelligence - between a complete douchebag and an altruistic intellectual.

The "felling" type should be renamed to "empathy," and there should be two dimensions, one for emotion, and one for analytical preference.

another flaw is that the test results conclude that people are "good" at things such as leadership when the MBTI methodology only claims they are preferences, not how "good" they are.

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"Respect" as a Weasel Word

I hear the word "respect" just about every day. Teachers say "students must respect me." Politicians say "citizens must respect the laws of the state." My friends say that "people must respect one another." However, the word "respect" is used in so many different ways that I cannot even define it.

Parents may define "respectful behavior" as not talking back, listening to them, and following the directions of their parents. However, if children think that their parents are wrong, they are compelled to "disrespect" their parents by talking back to them. They think that parents must "respect" them for correcting them. However, parents usually silence them without listening to their children. They will justify their imposed silence by telling them that children must "respect" authority figures such as their parents.

However, the child replies that he, himself, must be "respected" by the parent. He says that the parent "disrespected" him because the parent yelled at the child to prevent him from talking. He says that it is not necessary for his parent to yell at him, and says that it is not necessary for the parent to silence him, because he thinks that he has the right to correct his parents when they are wrong.

Let us analyze this. The parent defines "respectful behavior" as not talking back and obeying parents. This definition conflicts with the child's definition of "respectful" behavior. The child defines "respectful behavior" as not yelling and be more open-minded to listen to the child. Their definitions of "respect" differ. Their expectations of "respectful behavior" conflict.

The child and the parents become very angry at each other. Each side says that the other side "disrespected" me. This conflict become physical, and the parents definition of "respect" usually win out merely because the parent have more physical force.

Let's look at another example.

Your friend says that you are obligated to defend him when he is attacked. However, you refused to help defend him in an actual attack against him. Your friend says that "you have just disrespected me," and then threatened to punish you for not helping him to defend himself. You defend yourself by saying that "I have no obligation to defend you." Your expectations of "respectful behavior" differ from your friends. Your expectations are somewhat more lenient, and your friend's expectations are more strict.

You and your friend's definitions of "respect" conflict. Each side will say that the other "disrespected" him. He says that "you disrespected me for not helping to defend me." You say that "you disrespected me for obliging me to help you under the threat of punishment."

Your arguments heat up. You began to dislike each other. You feel betrayed at your friend. Your friend feels betrayed at you. Soon, your friendship breaks up. Friendship can end out of a mere conflict on the definition of "respect."

The above two examples, with the child and the parent, and with you and your friend, demonstrate an important point that is not discussed in any other psychology writings. The definitions of "respect" and "respectful behavior" are so ill-defined that it often ends up in conflicts and anger.

"Respect" can mean obedience to one's wishes. So if an authority figure demands "respect," he expects his subordinates to obey his directions, and not criticize him. He expects his subordinates to take his advice as whole-heartedly true. "Respect" just mean obeying to authority, even though you do not view the authority figure itself as legitimate.

In this case, the authority figure who demands "respect" will get very degraded when one of his subordinates criticize him. He will take that criticism as an insult to his advise. He thinks that he is always correct, and that his subordinates should not think for themselves because they do not have much intelligence to do just that.

Likewise, if a subordinate disobeys his order, he will take this too as an insult. He thinks that you are challenging his authority. He might tell you that you are being "disrespectful" to him because he feels degraded with your disobedience. He feels that you disobeyed because he thinks you find his order unnecessary or unimportant. He might therefore call you as "arrogant" for disobeying with his order, because he thinks that he you are not smart enough to think for yourself and not following him.

Narcissistic people have a more strict definition of "respectful behavior" to him, than someone who believes that he is not smart enough to think for themselves. The person who thinks that he deserves "more respect" than others often thinks that he is either more intelligent or wiser than you. That person defines "respectful behavior" as obeying him, listening to him, and not criticizing him. Conversely, he finds disobedience, avoidance, or criticism as "disrespectful to him." He thinks that others should listen to his advise and not criticize his advise because he believes that he is more intelligent than others so he has better advise.

In general, narcissistic people will get very insulted when others criticize them. Think about how a parent will feel when a child find them wrong. Think about how a teacher will feel when a student corrects him. Both will feel very insulted. Because narcissistic people will be greatly insulted when a others criticize or disobeys them, they will categorize criticism and disobedience as "disrespectful behavior."

Modest people have a somewhat more lenient definition of "respectful behavior." People do not consider disobedience to the orders decreed by modest people as "disrespectful." For example, people generally do not consider that not listening to children, or to disobey their wishes as "disrespectful." However, the reverse isn't true. People do, in fact, find it "disrespectful" for a child to not listen or disobey their parents.

What is there a double standard on the definitions of "respect"? Why are narcissistic people, such as parents and teachers, defined "respect" more strictly?

People generally have a somewhat more lenient expectation for low status people because they supposedly have low self-esteem and expect themselves to be wrong. They think that low status people will not get very angry when someone criticize them. They will not get angry when someone disobeys them.

This is not necessary the case.

In fact, children often feel insulted when a parent criticize them or demand them to do unnecessary stuff. Students often feel insulted when told agree with stuff that they disagree. They will often feel insulted when a teacher forces him to do stuff "for his own good."

Surprisingly, parents and teachers often insult their children and students in subtle ways. They accuse them of being malicious. They degrade their intelligence by telling them that "you are too young to understand that." They oversimplify or make up stories about stuff to their children and students. Yes, children and students often can detect that, and take offense to it. They will often get angry and yell at parents for this reason, while the parents think that they are yelling "for no reason." They will often punish their children and students for "being angry," when they made them angry at the first place. The students will get more angry at that punishment, and seek revenge against their teachers and parents. This endless cycle of degrading behavior will disturb the intimacy between the parent and the child, and the teacher and the student.

The parent or teacher think that their subordinates "disrespected" them. The children and students think that their super-ordinates "disrespected" them. They each have their own conception of "respect." This often disregards the other's expectations of "respect." Conflicts will arise from the mere expectations of "respect."

Going back to the question: Why is the definition of "respectful behavior" tend to be defined by narcissistic people, such as parents and teachers. Why isn't the definition of "respectful behavior" be defined by modest people, such as children and students? To answer this question: it is simply defined by you. It is defined by each and every one of you. Some people may agree with the parent, so they will agree with the parent's definition of "respectful behavior." Some children might be sympathetic to other abused children, so they will agree say that the parent is being disrespectful to them.

This all goes back to the legitimacy of the authority figure. In the United States, the majority of people will say that "tax evaders" are being "disrespectful" to the state. However, anarchists will disagree. Those anarchists say that the "tax evaders" are not being "disrespectful" to the state, because they do not view the state as a legitimate institution. People are being told to "respect" the flag, "respect" the constitution, and "respect" copyright laws. Would you find it "disrespectful" to disobey with Hitler or Stalin? Of course not.

Yes, the definition of "respect" is "colored" by the legitimacy of the person who demands "respect." Children who think that their parents' wishes are illegitimate will not think that they are being "disrespectful" when they disobey them. Students who think that the teacher is incorrect will not find it "disrespectful" to not listen to his advice.

However, not all teachers and parents will consider themselves as "illegitimate." Not all politicians or police officers will consider themselves as "illegitimate." Conflict will arise from the definitions of "respect."

We have shown that the definitions of "respect" differ from people to people. There is not a singular view of what behavior is "respectful" or "disrespectful." The word "respect" is a blanket term which changes meaning when applied to people of different personalities, e.g. narcissistic vs. modest. Narcissistic people have a more strict definition of "respect" than less narcissistic people. Your friends have a different definition of "respect" than your acquaintances.

Conflicts on the definitions of "respect" are often resolved by physical force. Parents and teachers will ultimately impose their version of "respect" to their subordinates. This is simply because they have more physical force to threaten their subordinates to listen and obey.

This is unfortunately the case. Whenever I hear someone say "he is disrespectful," I could imagine that the person that he is referring to may have a different expectation of "respect." Many people who demand their version of "respect" are not "respected" because their version of "respect" conflict with the expectations of "respect" of others.

This is why I dislike to use the word "respect." The word "respect" often shows one side of the situation. The word "respect" is used to cover-up the multiple perspectives of the situation.

In fact, people use the word "respect" as somewhat as glittering generalities. This is just like how politicians use the word "freedom," "liberty," and "responsibility." They are Orwellian terms, expected to persuade some others. The word "respect," too, should fall into this category.

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The Means-End Dichotomy: Some Clarifications

I replied to nirgraham's comment on Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy.

You start out with what seems to be a straw man.

Let me explain that you also strawmanned me.

praxeology does not ontologically assert the existance of things called 'means' and 'ends' that are actually in you. like a heart 'is in you', nor are they intended to reflect the functioning of the human mind overall.

Praxeology ontologically asserts the means/ends dichotomy because it uses a "proof by performative contradiction." Ontology is implicit in the "proof by performative contradiction." (See below).

rather they are necessary, (though not sufficient), for the possibility of economically/politicaly/(and some might say morally) analysable 'human action'/

That was what I am arguing by the term "intrumental abstraction" or "non-precisive abstraction." I said that the means/end dichotomy helps us to understand Robinson Crusoe economics and the producer/consumer goods distinction.

So praxeology asserts the means-end dichotomy as both ontologically necessary and necessary for an understanding of economics. I was only arguing against the former, not the latter. However, you assumed that I was arguing against the latter. So you strawmanned me.

does praxeology want to or need to 'reflect the /whole/ mind'?, no! it needs to reflect on the mind that 'acts', it is focused on actions. we talk about the memory in so far as it provides datum for deciding on means, we talk about empathy in that it might be datum for means etc.

I neither argued that praxeology reflects the whole mind, nor argued that cognitive psychology reflects the whole mind. It is an impossiblility for any theory to map the whole mind, because it is impossible to fuse the map with the territory. Just because I asserted that the means-end dichotomy is less precise than the desire-instinct-habit trichotomy, this does not claim that the former is false nor the latter is true. The former is just less precise.

And I did not argue that the more precision, the better. Too much precision results in unnecessary complexity, making it difficult to analyze the essentials.

what about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot

its logically necessary given our purpose, so we can...

That is a strawman.

Let us look at my whole quote:

What about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot just assume "means" and "ends" and then apply it into any economic or ethical system without justifying it by precision arguments to understanding it."

I meant that Robinson Crusoe economics could justify the means-end dichotomy, but the means-end dichotomy cannot justify Robinson Crusoe economics.

I am arguing that Robinson Crusoe economics does not need too much precision, so it could justify the means-end dichotomy. However, more complex subjects such as ethics cannot justify the means-end dichotomy, because ethics requires extreme precision. The extreme precision that ethics requires must be counterbalanced by more precisive psychology rather than unprecise means and ends.

This is the main idea that I am arguing against:

Can we derive the means-end dichotomy from human psychology? (...), we cannot.

no, we derive it from the logical impossibilty of 'human action' occurring without means... and the logical impossibility of 'action' occuring without any goal (without any preference demonstration). (if you like, we are discounting any observable behaviour that is not purpuseful as being beyond our interest, it is not a human action, but mere datum that any actioner would take into consideration, but that is all).

nirgraham argued that a performative contradiction can "prove" the means-end dichotomy. However, I oppose the "proof by proformative contradiction" argument. Even though I disagree with the "proof by performative contradiction", I still accept that argument as logically consistent. However, I question the logical soundness of the "proof by performative contradiction."

All "proofs by performative contradiction" ontologically presumes the existence of its premises. Therefore, the conclusions of the argument depend on the soundness of its premises. However, the premises cannot be perfectly sound because you cannot fuse the map with the territory. Therefore, the conclusion of the argument also cannot be perfectly sound.

I may critique the "proof by performative contradiction" in greater detail in another post.

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Abstract Words

I posted a response to this discussion on the means-end dichotomy.

nirgrahamUK: http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/Ha_04.pdf ? its 4 and a half big font pages.Thank you, though not for the link. I read Human Action from beginning to end.

I mean "thank you", for demonstrating that I had not written what I meant clearly enough. Thank you for showing that I had communicated my thoughts poorly.

You have done an important thing. You have demonstrated that you have terminological differences than me. I had probably used the word "axiom" an a way differently that you had interpreted it. Thank you for taking note of the different interpretations of the words I wrote.

I will write more carefully next time. I will not just write a few sentences to explain my thoughts. I understand the impossibility to express what I had meant with those meager sentences. I learned that no one could write understandable text in philosophy, without expressing each detail in several paragraphs or even pages. Philosophy, which deals with extremely abstract ideas, will inevitably have terminological problems.

More concrete ideas, such as a "pencil", have no definitional conflicts. Almost everyone has the same definitions for "pencil", "chair", and "table". But not so with more abstract ideas, such as "state", "nature", "aggression", "subjectivism", and "objectivism". For example, libertarians commonly define a "state" as a "monopoly of violence funded by taxation". Meanwhile, brainwashed statists defines the "state" as "a beneficial institution that provides services for the population." Generally, the more abstract the idea, the more conflicts over its definition.

Philosophy, ethics, and logic have a lot of abstract ideas. Therefore, those topics would probably have a potential significant amount of terminological differences. This thread itself deals with ethics. Therefore, this thread will, and has, suffered from semantic problems.

Unfortunately, as I mentioned above, I could clearly write my thoughts clearly only if I expanded my writing. I must write several paragraphs or pages to express an idea clearly, not just in a few meager sentences.

However, we all hate to write long forum posts. As we all know, some readers do not enjoy going through long posts, because it consumes too much time.

Abstract topics, such as philosophy, ethics, and logic, make a lot of trouble in forums. Why? Because that we cannot clarify our semantics in a few sentences. It requires several paragraphs or pages to resolve a single definition.

Some members of this forum shortcut their communication. They write their ideas and critiques only in a few sentences. As we know, this will only make the text ambiguous to other members. These members think that they will save time by writing a few sentences for each idea. They think that they will save the time by not tediously going through several paragraphs or pages to describe each idea.

Wrong! This will only waste more time than doing it in the verbose way. Ambiguous text only bait irrelevant responses, strawmans, and red herrings. In addition, shortcutting their communication will only bait others to badly interpret the text, thus cause threads to go off topic. These threads will get boring, and will eventually end that way. Without a long post clarifying the terminology, those debates will never resolve.

This has happened to my long comments at blogs such as Polycentric Order. This has happened to my long posts here.

Because of this, I usually ignore debating philosophy, ethics, and logic within these forums.

I have now finished typing the first half of my post. In the second half, I will clarify what I had meant in my last post.

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Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy

I posted a response to this discussion on the means-end dichotomy.

What do I mean when I say "I reject the means-end dichotomy"?

I mean that assuming that "means" and "ends" exist within humans is far too arbitrary. The abstractions of "means" and "ends" does not accurately reflect the human mind.

The means-end dichotomy can have useful applications. It helped us to understand Robinson Crusoe economics of how capital goods originate. Crusoe developed capital goods as a means to further his ends. The means-end dichotomy helped us to understand how producer and consumer goods behave in accord to human desires.

Therefore, the means-end dichotomy functions as an instrumental abstraction. Despite its unsoundness, it helps us to understand economic ideas. Roderick Long has used the term "non-precisive abstraction" to denote a similar idea.

So can we derive instrumental abstractions from science. Can we derive the means-end dichotomy from human psychology? However, we cannot.

We cannot derive instrumental abstractions from science. We can only apply instrumental abstractions to help us understand more complicated ideas. Mises has made a mistake of trying to derive instrumental abstractions from science.

For example, take Mises' argument for mythological individualism. Mises performed an ontological argument for methodological individualism. He said that "collectives do not exist, only individuals exist." He actually derived this instrumental abstraction.

However, in the social sciences, methodological individualism helps us understand social behavior with more precision. Because methodological individualism focuses on the individual to observe social trends, it has more precision than, say, examining social behavior by countries. Saying that "Germany attacked France" goes against methodological individualism, because it observes social behavior as countries instead of its constituent individuals.

However, as we emphasized, we cannot derive methodological individualism by making the ontological arguments. We can only justify methodological individualism for its practical application to help us understand social behavior with more precision.

We will discuss another mistake by Mises on instrumental abstractions. Mises derived ordinal value from science. He cannot do this. He can only justify ordinal value for its practical application.

We will list some practical applications of ordinal value over cardinal value in helping to understand the free price system:

• The simplicity of ordinal value transgressing the overcomplicated numerical calculations of cardinal value.
• A sound understanding of the behavior of the free price system does not require cardinal value.

Mises claimed the "impossibility" of cardinal value. This seems correct to some extent, because the human brain does not store utility in cardinal numbers. However, we could still implement cardinal value in economics. We can "numericalize" cardinal values by measuring pleasure experienced by neurons in the human brain and then converting it to some unit. Just like how we measure temperature by a thermometer. But we deny this, not because of its "impossibility", but of the two advantages of ordinal value over cardinal value: its simplicity and unnecessity.

We have demonstrated that ontological arguments such as "collectives do not exist" or "cardinal value does not exist" are irrelevant in the justification of instrumental abstractions. Mises could have truncated his ontological arguments in Human Action, while still making his book through and logical, or even better, because it's shorter. He could have explained that methodological individualism offers more precision in examining human behavior, instead of the ontological argument that "collectives do not exist." He could have explained that ordinal value offers more simplicity and the unnecessity of numerical calculations of cardinal value, instead of the ontological argument that "cardinal value does not exist." The incorporation of ontological arguments and the exclusion of precision arguments are one of the major mistakes in Human Actions.

Ontological arguments, besides its unnecessity, are even flawed in justifying instrumental values. To a certain degree, "collectives do exist". To a certain degree, "cardinal value does exist" (as shown by the neuron-thermometer example). Mises falsely assumed that the "existence" of an entity requires the unanimous existence in all contexts with perfect accuracy.

What about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot just assume "means" and "ends" and then apply it into any economic or ethical system without justifying it by precision arguments to understanding it. It is far too arbitrary to incorporate that "means" and "ends" into an ethical system just because these two words exist in the English language. Roderick Long extends the precision by splitting "means" into "constitutive means" and "instrumental means."

However, we could extend the precision further by replacing the two words "means" and "ends" with another set of words related to cognitive psychology. Instead of "means" and "ends", we could use "desires", "instincts", "habits", and "reflexes". Those four terms increase the precision further, instead of two under the means-end dichotomy. If interpreted under the means-end dichotomy, "habits" can sometimes be a means and sometimes be an end, and sometimes both. "Desires" can sometimes be a means because desires can change, and sometimes be and end in itself. While the means-ends dichotomy disregards and "desires" and "reflexes", cognitive psychology increases its precision further.

The means-end dichotomy is arbitrary because it disregards the precision, and oversimplifies them into means and ends. While Roderick Long and some Aristolean liberals improves upon it by either splitting "means" into "constitutive means" and "instrumental means," or, as in Aristotelian ethics, an "ultimate end to life". However, Aristotelian liberalism still has less precision than grounding ethics with cognitive psychology.

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Ambiguous Ethical Terminology

Roderick Long has written his argument for "natural law". We should first note that the term "natural law" has multiple definitions. Even Long himself confused the definitions.

Now we can see where Rollins' critique has gone wrong. Rollins is thinking of natural rights as if they were a special kind of legal right — a right legislated by God or Nature rather than by the state. Given that assumption, what he says makes sense: legal rights are of little value unless they are also de facto rights. (When Rollins refers to "real rights" as "those rights actually conferred and enforced by the laws of a State or the customs of a social group," he clearly has in mind de facto rights.) Just as it does me no good to have a legal right on paper that the state pays lip service to in theory but systematically ignores in practice, so it does me no good to have a natural right inscribed in the Law of Nature if no one is willing or able to enforce that right.

But this is the wrong way to think about natural rights. A natural right isn't a legal right, it's a normative right. To claim that natural rights don't protect anything is to miss the point; natural rights are supposed to receive protection, not to provide it. Likewise, the function of Natural Law is not to protect any claims, but rather to tell us which claims deserve protection. As normative concepts, natural rights provide guidance for people's conduct. Blaming natural rights for not protecting us is like blaming a cookbook for not making dinner. Cookbooks don't make dinner for us; their purpose is to teach us how to make dinner for ourselves. Likewise, Natural Law doesn't lead our lives for us; its purpose is to guide us in the living of our own lives.3

Long here wins the first argument.

However, Long had used a different definition of "natural rights" than what Rothbard uses. In addition, he has conflated "natural rights" and "natural law," which could mean two distinct topics.

A user named "wilderness" at the Mises Community has made the same mistake.

Taken to the further extreme it's why some can't figure out why protecting somebody's natural rights is in each individuals best interest. It's why somebody comes along and states, they "don't give a damn about liberty"... it's sickening. And why they can't understand murder, rape, and theft is not helpful. Secondly, cause of somebody like Rollins who is really confused.

Wilderness has conflated the "natural rights" written in the U.S. Constitution with the "natural law" of Rothbard.

Rollins is more willing than most critics of Natural Law to face the logical consequences of his position. But if morality is merely a tool for manipulating other people into doing what one wants, one wonders why people ever wrestle privately with moral dilemmas, why they ever find themselves compelled by conscience to do something that is unwelcome not only to themselves but to those around them.

More importantly, though, the question is why we should accept Rollins' claim that nothing is right or wrong and nothing is entitled to reverence. These are extraordinary claims, claims that run contrary to our ordinary beliefs and practices, and so the burden of proof rests with the person making such claims.

Long used a different definition of 'morality' than Rollins. Rollins does not reject 'morality' in the sense what Long uses. Therefore, Long made a strawman argument.

Long argues this from the "performative contradiction." Some self-identified "objectivists" use performative contradiction argument to criticize "subjectivism." They argue that "subjectivists believe that everything originate from subjective preference, but deny subjectivism itself as a subjective preference." However, the self-identified "objectivists" use a different definition of "subjectivism" than what the self-identified "subjecitivists" themselves do. The self-identified "subjectivists" could refute that argument by showing that each side uses a different definition of "subjective." They use the term "subjective" to mean beliefs and values in the mind.

Although we should not reject the "performative contradiction" as a valid argument, the performative contradiction argument has potential flaws. Its flaws stem from the soundness of its premises. The soundness of a performative contradiction argument depends on the soundness of its premises.

Some examples of performative contradiction arguments:

• It is self-contradictory to reject the Aristotelian laws of identity, the excluded middle, and non-contradiction.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ludwig von Mises' law of human action.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ludwig von Mises' psychological egoism.
• It is self-contradictory to reject "cogito, ergo sum."
• It is self-contradictory to reject Murray Rothbard's argument for self-ownership.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Hans-Hermann Hoppe's argumentation ethics.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Stephen Kinsella's estoppel argument.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Stefan Molyneux's universally preferable behavior.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ayn Rand's, Douglas Rasmussen's, and Douglas Den Uyl's attempts to derive "ought" from "is."

Long conflated five different definitions of "amoralism."

In the moral case, for example, Rollins, a self-proclaimed "amoralist," chooses to hold on to what most would view as a highly implausible belief — the belief that there is nothing wrong with "murder, rape, robbery, or torturing children" — and to reject more plausible beliefs whenever they come into conflict with that one.

The first definition of "amoralism" signifies the descriptive notion that "rights do not tangibly exist." In the second sense, the term "amoralism" functions as a mere synonym for "quasi-realism" or "moral fictionalism." The third sense signifies the notion that using terms such as "right" and "wrong" in describing ethical commands can create conflicts between the interpretation of rights and grey areas. In the fourth sense "amoralism" signifies that "I do not feel any empathy for others. Therefore, I want to legalize rape and murder." The fifth sense of "amoralism" signifies irrelevant to morality, for example, "science is amoral because it does not deal with normative opinions."

Rollins probably used "amoralism" in the third sense, while Long probably used "amoralism" in the fourth sense.

We may think of our evolutionarily-implanted normative impulses as playing a role in moral reasoning analogous to the role that sensory experience plays in scientific reasoning. The data of the senses are one of the most important sources of our beliefs about how the universe works. But we are not confined to the sensory level. Our capacity for reason drives us to try to build up a conceptual picture of the universe that makes sense; and although we rely heavily on sensory data in building that picture, if we have to sacrifice some sensory data in order to achieve a scientific picture that makes a little more sense — if we have to decide that, despite initial appearances, the earth isn't flat, the sun doesn't circle it, and tables aren't continuously solid all the way down — then some of what the senses tell us may have to be scrapped for the sake of a more intellectually satisfying theory.

Long has used confusing terms such as "sensation," "perception," and "conception." He then equivocates "evolutionarily-implanted normative impulse" with the "sensory level." He has failed to define these three terms.

Likewise, our evolutionarily-implanted moral impulses are one of the most important sources of our beliefs about how we ought to live. But we are not confined to the instinctual level. Our capacity for reason drives us to try to build up a conceptual picture of right and wrong that makes sense; and although we rely heavily on innate impulses in building that picture, if we have to disregard some of our innate impulses in order to achieve a moral picture that makes a little more sense — if we have to decide that, despite our initial impulses, we shouldn't kill animals for food — then some of what our moral instincts tell us may have to be scrapped for the sake of a more intellectually satisfying ethic. Once again, a purely evolutionary account of our sense of morality, however illuminating, will be importantly incomplete.

Long presupposes a dichotomy between "innate impulse" and "reason." He then equivocates "innate impulse" with "evolutionarily-implanted normative impulse." I believe that Long has used a strawman argument against Rich Hammer. Hammer does not want to abolish "ethical reasoning" altogether in place of "evolutionarily-implanted normative instincts." If Hammer however wanted to abolish "ethical reasoning" altogether, then he would not have written his book.

This article is yet another example of how terminological differences can create chaos. Just imagine if we had resolved all of our terminological differences...

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Psychological Egoism = Psychological Atomism

This is previously posted on the Ludwig von Mises forums.

It is arbitrary to label the brain as "egoistic" when the components of the brain are not. Likewise, it is absurd to label the brain as "egoistic" when composites of the "whole brain" are not.

Let us look into this. Assume that the human brain is divided into parts or modules. Each part functions independently with each other. However, they often conflict with each other.

Let us imagine a brain with three parts. One part of the brain, called area-A, deals with the maximization of pleasure. Another part of the brain, called area-B, deals with the maximization of acquiring wealth. Another part, area-C, deals with the minimization of pain.

How do they function? Area-A tries to maximize pleasure when area-C tries to minimize pain. They conflict with each other: does area-A want more pain at the tradeoff of more pleasure, or vice versa? Does area-A want desire short-term pleasure at the expense of long-term pain of area-C? How much pleasure and pain should each of these areas settle?

How does area-A and area-C resolve those conflicts? Area-A sometimes have to sacrifice pleasure for less pain in area-C. Area-C may have to increase pain threadhold for area-A to gain long-term pleasure in the future. All these actions involves area-A or area-C sacrificing with each other. Area-C may sometimes altruistically benefit area-A, and sometimes area-C may be altruistic to area-A.

Should we say that area-A and area-C behave in their own interests, or they collectively interact for the greater interest to "maximize" the "whole brain," the composite satisfaction of area-A, area-B, and area-C?

The question is that the interactions between the three components are selfish or the component parts -- areas-A, area-B, and area-C -- are each selfish but altruistic relative to the composite brain combined?

Let us look at the family.

We will use a metaphor of brain parts to represent family members. One part of the brain, called area-A, represents the mother. Another part represents, called area-B, represets the father. The third part represents, called area-C, represents the child.

The family members help each other. Each family member help one another when one is sick. Each help one another on housework. Why do all three family members help one another? Because they have an innate instinct to help each family member. Humans have evolved an instinct to help their kins. Therefore, can we describe the whole family as based on "self-interest"?

Each person is interconnected with one another in the form of an instinct to help each kin, for the greater benefit of the family. Similarly, each part of the brain conflict with each other, for the greater benefit of the aggregate brain.

Psychological egoists describe each family member as "egoistic" even when they help one another. This seems intuitively correct. However, could we say that each of the three parts of the brain are egoistic themselves, just like what each family member are?

Likewise, could we describe the aggregate "whole brain" is overall egoistic? Psychological egoists would tend to agree. But could we describe the family collectively itself as egoistic? Psychological egoists may intuitively disagree.

Each of the three brain components conflict and compromise with each other, producing an overall equilibrium. Similarly, each family member may conflict and compromise with each other, producing an overall equilibrium. Could we say that the overall equlibrium is "egoistic"? Could we say that the aggregates of the three components are as egoistic as the aggregates of the three family members?

Why do psychological egoists arbitrarily pick the brain as "egoistic," while the family member as a whole as not "egoistic"? This is very arbitrary.

One may object that the best level is to pick the individual brain, instead of groups more than one person. They claim that is is more accurate to analyze action on the individual level rather than the group level. They practice methodological individualism.

However, picking the "whole brain" as the starting point of egoism is very arbitrary. Why do psychological egoists deny that "the family as a whole" as not egoistic but assert that "the brain as a whole" as egoistic? All parts in these two interact, conflict, and compromise with each other, right?

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Ex Post Facto Rationalizations in Ethics

Below is a full reply to Cork's post on abortion:

The legitimacy of abortion should have nothing to do with your interpretation of the non-aggression and the proportionality principle. The non-aggression principle can have potentially arbitrary interpretations.

As you know, not all self-described "libertarian anarchists" hold the same views. For instance, some libertarians support animal rights, some oppose abortion, some criticize retributive punishment, and some others support some parental authority. Those views conflict and compete with one another to attract attention.

As we have said previously, one could interpret the non-aggression principle in about a gazillion ways. Some anti-abortionists might feel cognitive dissonance, and thus interpret abortion as a form of aggression. Likewise, some others may interpret retributive punishment as a form of invasion against the criminal. Let us recall the problems of interpreting the non-aggression principle.

Does does the "non-aggression principle" allow "right to self-defense" or the "right to violently punish others"? Does the "non-aggression principle" allow trespassing or hate speech? We will show that the term "aggression" is highly vague.

Some will define "aggression" as "the initiation of physical violence." However, the term physical violence is also vague. Does "physical violence" include noise pollution? Does it include perceived threats of violence? Does "physical violence" include fraud? Whether noise pollution, threats of violence, and fraud are "physical violence" still begs the question.

Libertarians usually defend the right for broadcasters to homestead radio frequencies. However, if a malicious broadcaster "trespasses" another broadcaster's radio frequency, can we label this as "physical violence"? Obviously, the criminal changed nothing physical or tangible. This, also, begs the question whether if we should consider it as "physical violence." This same argument applies with the ownership of domain names.

Consequentially, it begs the question to ask whether anti-defamation laws violate the non-aggression principle. It also begs the question to ask whether the prohibition of nuclear weapons violate the non-aggression principle. In addition, it begs the question to ask whether ordering carbon dioxide polluters to pay restitution violates the non-aggression principle.

Libertarians define "individual sovereignty" as a state in which no one commits aggression against any individual. So far so good.

However, as we recall above, the word "aggression" has arbitrary interpretations. As a result, "individual sovereignty," which depends on the definition of "aggression," also has arbitrary interpretations. I found your usage of "self-ownership" in you elucidation above, therefore, as problematic.

As a consequence, we should only establish the definition of "libertarianism," "non-aggression principle," and "self-ownership" only prototypically. By "prototypically" we meant the prototype theory of classification. Libertarianism does not have any clear-cut "essence," and so does not "aggression" and "personal sovereignty."

Let us take abortion as an example of the arbitrariness of law.

The genuine causes of the abortion controversy arise from religion, empathy, and the definition of life.

Referring to the non-aggression principle constitutes as a type of cognitive dissonance. Judges, for example, use the law to legitimize their evil decrees. They have the power to interpret the law in any biased way, even though the law appears "objective" to the general population.

Legitimizing morality in the name of "it confirms/violates the non-aggression principle" is an appeal to the rule of law. It does not state any reason of the immorality itself, but an appeal to the law of non-aggression. It also begs the question if specific acts violate the non-aggression principle.

"Unborn babies" are parasites and if the mother does not want one in her body, she should not be forced to support one.

I have an objection. It depends on your definition of "parasite."

Aging can also be considered a parasite. So does cancer. If cancer is a parasite, does it give any right for the patient to steal money from a rich person for his treatment? It is a type of theft against the rich person.

Anti-abortionists consider fetuses as living beings. Like the cancer patent, the mother does not have any right to murder against another person, the fetus.

However, I do not oppose abortion. I am making a point that the non-aggression principle and laws can have potentially arbitrary interpretations, and could possibly justify any evil behavior.

The reason the cancer patient should not be allowed to steal from a "rich person" is because the rich person is *not* the parasite.

That is a common objection, but it still depends on the your interpretation of "parasite."

You agree that life is more valuable than property. The rich person can be interpreted as a kind of "parasite" you allow the person to be rich at the expense of killing someone. The rich person could just donate his money on the condition that the mother does not abort the child. So the rich person is causing the mother the kill her child by not donating to the mother. Therefore, you are valuing the rich person's property greater that you value the fetus's life. You do not support subsidizing the mother giving birth instead of aborting her child.

The law forbids murder and rape. Therefore, the would-be murderers and the would-be rapists cannot satisfy their preferences. The would-be victims of murder and rape are technically "parasites" in a sense, because we our preferences for life and against rape are brought about the expense of the preferences of the murderers and rapists. The victims of rape and murder are parasites in a sense and the murderers and rapists are the "victims" in a sense.

So do laws that forbid petty crimes such as adultery. Suppose a wife has cheated on her husband with another man. The wife, here, can both be a victim and a predator. She is a "victim" of the in the sense that the anti-adultery law does not grant her the liberty to cheat on her husband, then punished for it. She is an predator in a sense since she violated the adultery law and that she has angered her husband.

So the rich person can technically be interpreted as a parasite, in a sense. The enforcement of property rights have positive effects on the intelligent and the productive people, at the expense of the unproductive, the lazy, and the dim-witted people. Since the rich person is rich because of property rights, he is a parasite to the poor people. And, because, the enforcement of "property rights" is just a law that makes some more productive at the expense of others, it can form parasites and the exploited: The enforcement of property rights exploit the mentally incompetent, the disabled people, and the unproductive people.

The rich person is a parasite to the fetus in a way that the rich is not subsidizing the mother on the condition that the mother will not abort the fetus.

My point is that the rich person can be interpreted as a "parasite" in a sense, depending on one's self-knowledge. But we have to go back to my original point is that it is circular reasoning to justify laws from the non-aggression principle. It begs the question.

Anti-murder laws restrain the would-be murderer's liberty at the expense of the would-be victim's liberty to be alive. Anti-adultery laws retrain the would-be cheater's liberty at the expense of the spouse's liberty to not be cheated. Property laws restrain the disabled, lazy, mentally incompetent, and the unproductive's liberty at the expense of the liberty of the productive, efficient, and intelligent to create wealth. Pro-abortion laws restrain the fetus's liberty to stay alive at the expense of the rich person's willingness to not donate money to the pregnant mother.

Those who violate the non-aggression principle are labelled parasites, predators, aggressors, or criminals. Those who have experienced a violation of the non-aggression principle are called the victims, the prey, the exploited.

So terms such as "parasite," "predator," "aggressor," "tortfeasor," "criminal," "victim," and "prey" depend on one's definition or interpretation of the non-aggression principle or the law. These terms have different meanings according to one's perspective to the law.

Even libertarians themselves have different meanings for these terms. Some libertarians oppose retributive punishment, some oppose abortion, and some support animal rights. They therefore, have different interpretations of the words such as "parasite," "predator," and "victim." Your argument for abortion is like telling a libertarian who supports animal rights that the abused animals are not the "victims" of human "predators." Since they hold a differing interpretation of "aggression," your usage of these terms are circular, and might never influence them.

This is the reason why your sophistic arguments do not work. What we should be really debating with the anti-abortionists is religion and what constitutes human life.

Here's an example of natural law:

1. Each and every individual should enjoy the full product of his labor. No one else other than the individual can accurately estimate cost of labor that he has worked to produce a good. Therefore, no one else can exchange his good with another good or take his good without the individual's permission because the cost labor he has put into producing the good may be more than others may have perceived. Exchanging a good without consent should be forbidden because the individual may lose some fruits of his labor due to the fact that others may underestimate how much labor one worked to produce that good.
2. If both parties agree to exchange, the exchange is voluntary. Each individual can accurately estimate how much labor he has worked to produce his respective good. Each individual can also estimate the usability of his traders' goods. Therefore, both would maintain their full products of their labor, plus the value each benefited from the exchange.

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