The Means-End Dichotomy: Some Clarifications

I replied to nirgraham's comment on Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy.

You start out with what seems to be a straw man.

Let me explain that you also strawmanned me.

praxeology does not ontologically assert the existance of things called 'means' and 'ends' that are actually in you. like a heart 'is in you', nor are they intended to reflect the functioning of the human mind overall.

Praxeology ontologically asserts the means/ends dichotomy because it uses a "proof by performative contradiction." Ontology is implicit in the "proof by performative contradiction." (See below).

rather they are necessary, (though not sufficient), for the possibility of economically/politicaly/(and some might say morally) analysable 'human action'/

That was what I am arguing by the term "intrumental abstraction" or "non-precisive abstraction." I said that the means/end dichotomy helps us to understand Robinson Crusoe economics and the producer/consumer goods distinction.

So praxeology asserts the means-end dichotomy as both ontologically necessary and necessary for an understanding of economics. I was only arguing against the former, not the latter. However, you assumed that I was arguing against the latter. So you strawmanned me.

does praxeology want to or need to 'reflect the /whole/ mind'?, no! it needs to reflect on the mind that 'acts', it is focused on actions. we talk about the memory in so far as it provides datum for deciding on means, we talk about empathy in that it might be datum for means etc.

I neither argued that praxeology reflects the whole mind, nor argued that cognitive psychology reflects the whole mind. It is an impossiblility for any theory to map the whole mind, because it is impossible to fuse the map with the territory. Just because I asserted that the means-end dichotomy is less precise than the desire-instinct-habit trichotomy, this does not claim that the former is false nor the latter is true. The former is just less precise.

And I did not argue that the more precision, the better. Too much precision results in unnecessary complexity, making it difficult to analyze the essentials.

what about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot

its logically necessary given our purpose, so we can...

That is a strawman.

Let us look at my whole quote:

What about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot just assume "means" and "ends" and then apply it into any economic or ethical system without justifying it by precision arguments to understanding it."

I meant that Robinson Crusoe economics could justify the means-end dichotomy, but the means-end dichotomy cannot justify Robinson Crusoe economics.

I am arguing that Robinson Crusoe economics does not need too much precision, so it could justify the means-end dichotomy. However, more complex subjects such as ethics cannot justify the means-end dichotomy, because ethics requires extreme precision. The extreme precision that ethics requires must be counterbalanced by more precisive psychology rather than unprecise means and ends.

This is the main idea that I am arguing against:

Can we derive the means-end dichotomy from human psychology? (...), we cannot.

no, we derive it from the logical impossibilty of 'human action' occurring without means... and the logical impossibility of 'action' occuring without any goal (without any preference demonstration). (if you like, we are discounting any observable behaviour that is not purpuseful as being beyond our interest, it is not a human action, but mere datum that any actioner would take into consideration, but that is all).

nirgraham argued that a performative contradiction can "prove" the means-end dichotomy. However, I oppose the "proof by proformative contradiction" argument. Even though I disagree with the "proof by performative contradiction", I still accept that argument as logically consistent. However, I question the logical soundness of the "proof by performative contradiction."

All "proofs by performative contradiction" ontologically presumes the existence of its premises. Therefore, the conclusions of the argument depend on the soundness of its premises. However, the premises cannot be perfectly sound because you cannot fuse the map with the territory. Therefore, the conclusion of the argument also cannot be perfectly sound.

I may critique the "proof by performative contradiction" in greater detail in another post.

Abstract Words

I posted a response to this discussion on the means-end dichotomy.

nirgrahamUK: http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/Ha_04.pdf ? its 4 and a half big font pages.Thank you, though not for the link. I read Human Action from beginning to end.

I mean "thank you", for demonstrating that I had not written what I meant clearly enough. Thank you for showing that I had communicated my thoughts poorly.

You have done an important thing. You have demonstrated that you have terminological differences than me. I had probably used the word "axiom" an a way differently that you had interpreted it. Thank you for taking note of the different interpretations of the words I wrote.

I will write more carefully next time. I will not just write a few sentences to explain my thoughts. I understand the impossibility to express what I had meant with those meager sentences. I learned that no one could write understandable text in philosophy, without expressing each detail in several paragraphs or even pages. Philosophy, which deals with extremely abstract ideas, will inevitably have terminological problems.

More concrete ideas, such as a "pencil", have no definitional conflicts. Almost everyone has the same definitions for "pencil", "chair", and "table". But not so with more abstract ideas, such as "state", "nature", "aggression", "subjectivism", and "objectivism". For example, libertarians commonly define a "state" as a "monopoly of violence funded by taxation". Meanwhile, brainwashed statists defines the "state" as "a beneficial institution that provides services for the population." Generally, the more abstract the idea, the more conflicts over its definition.

Philosophy, ethics, and logic have a lot of abstract ideas. Therefore, those topics would probably have a potential significant amount of terminological differences. This thread itself deals with ethics. Therefore, this thread will, and has, suffered from semantic problems.

Unfortunately, as I mentioned above, I could clearly write my thoughts clearly only if I expanded my writing. I must write several paragraphs or pages to express an idea clearly, not just in a few meager sentences.

However, we all hate to write long forum posts. As we all know, some readers do not enjoy going through long posts, because it consumes too much time.

Abstract topics, such as philosophy, ethics, and logic, make a lot of trouble in forums. Why? Because that we cannot clarify our semantics in a few sentences. It requires several paragraphs or pages to resolve a single definition.

Some members of this forum shortcut their communication. They write their ideas and critiques only in a few sentences. As we know, this will only make the text ambiguous to other members. These members think that they will save time by writing a few sentences for each idea. They think that they will save the time by not tediously going through several paragraphs or pages to describe each idea.

Wrong! This will only waste more time than doing it in the verbose way. Ambiguous text only bait irrelevant responses, strawmans, and red herrings. In addition, shortcutting their communication will only bait others to badly interpret the text, thus cause threads to go off topic. These threads will get boring, and will eventually end that way. Without a long post clarifying the terminology, those debates will never resolve.

This has happened to my long comments at blogs such as Polycentric Order. This has happened to my long posts here.

Because of this, I usually ignore debating philosophy, ethics, and logic within these forums.

I have now finished typing the first half of my post. In the second half, I will clarify what I had meant in my last post.

Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy

I posted a response to this discussion on the means-end dichotomy.

What do I mean when I say "I reject the means-end dichotomy"?

I mean that assuming that "means" and "ends" exist within humans is far too arbitrary. The abstractions of "means" and "ends" does not accurately reflect the human mind.

The means-end dichotomy can have useful applications. It helped us to understand Robinson Crusoe economics of how capital goods originate. Crusoe developed capital goods as a means to further his ends. The means-end dichotomy helped us to understand how producer and consumer goods behave in accord to human desires.

Therefore, the means-end dichotomy functions as an instrumental abstraction. Despite its unsoundness, it helps us to understand economic ideas. Roderick Long has used the term "non-precisive abstraction" to denote a similar idea.

So can we derive instrumental abstractions from science. Can we derive the means-end dichotomy from human psychology? However, we cannot.

We cannot derive instrumental abstractions from science. We can only apply instrumental abstractions to help us understand more complicated ideas. Mises has made a mistake of trying to derive instrumental abstractions from science.

For example, take Mises' argument for mythological individualism. Mises performed an ontological argument for methodological individualism. He said that "collectives do not exist, only individuals exist." He actually derived this instrumental abstraction.

However, in the social sciences, methodological individualism helps us understand social behavior with more precision. Because methodological individualism focuses on the individual to observe social trends, it has more precision than, say, examining social behavior by countries. Saying that "Germany attacked France" goes against methodological individualism, because it observes social behavior as countries instead of its constituent individuals.

However, as we emphasized, we cannot derive methodological individualism by making the ontological arguments. We can only justify methodological individualism for its practical application to help us understand social behavior with more precision.

We will discuss another mistake by Mises on instrumental abstractions. Mises derived ordinal value from science. He cannot do this. He can only justify ordinal value for its practical application.

We will list some practical applications of ordinal value over cardinal value in helping to understand the free price system:

• The simplicity of ordinal value transgressing the overcomplicated numerical calculations of cardinal value.
• A sound understanding of the behavior of the free price system does not require cardinal value.

Mises claimed the "impossibility" of cardinal value. This seems correct to some extent, because the human brain does not store utility in cardinal numbers. However, we could still implement cardinal value in economics. We can "numericalize" cardinal values by measuring pleasure experienced by neurons in the human brain and then converting it to some unit. Just like how we measure temperature by a thermometer. But we deny this, not because of its "impossibility", but of the two advantages of ordinal value over cardinal value: its simplicity and unnecessity.

We have demonstrated that ontological arguments such as "collectives do not exist" or "cardinal value does not exist" are irrelevant in the justification of instrumental abstractions. Mises could have truncated his ontological arguments in Human Action, while still making his book through and logical, or even better, because it's shorter. He could have explained that methodological individualism offers more precision in examining human behavior, instead of the ontological argument that "collectives do not exist." He could have explained that ordinal value offers more simplicity and the unnecessity of numerical calculations of cardinal value, instead of the ontological argument that "cardinal value does not exist." The incorporation of ontological arguments and the exclusion of precision arguments are one of the major mistakes in Human Actions.

Ontological arguments, besides its unnecessity, are even flawed in justifying instrumental values. To a certain degree, "collectives do exist". To a certain degree, "cardinal value does exist" (as shown by the neuron-thermometer example). Mises falsely assumed that the "existence" of an entity requires the unanimous existence in all contexts with perfect accuracy.

What about the means-end dichotomy? As said, we can consider it as an instrumental abstraction. Therefore, we cannot just assume "means" and "ends" and then apply it into any economic or ethical system without justifying it by precision arguments to understanding it. It is far too arbitrary to incorporate that "means" and "ends" into an ethical system just because these two words exist in the English language. Roderick Long extends the precision by splitting "means" into "constitutive means" and "instrumental means."

However, we could extend the precision further by replacing the two words "means" and "ends" with another set of words related to cognitive psychology. Instead of "means" and "ends", we could use "desires", "instincts", "habits", and "reflexes". Those four terms increase the precision further, instead of two under the means-end dichotomy. If interpreted under the means-end dichotomy, "habits" can sometimes be a means and sometimes be an end, and sometimes both. "Desires" can sometimes be a means because desires can change, and sometimes be and end in itself. While the means-ends dichotomy disregards and "desires" and "reflexes", cognitive psychology increases its precision further.

The means-end dichotomy is arbitrary because it disregards the precision, and oversimplifies them into means and ends. While Roderick Long and some Aristolean liberals improves upon it by either splitting "means" into "constitutive means" and "instrumental means," or, as in Aristotelian ethics, an "ultimate end to life". However, Aristotelian liberalism still has less precision than grounding ethics with cognitive psychology.

Ambiguous Ethical Terminology

Roderick Long has written his argument for "natural law". We should first note that the term "natural law" has multiple definitions. Even Long himself confused the definitions.

Now we can see where Rollins' critique has gone wrong. Rollins is thinking of natural rights as if they were a special kind of legal right — a right legislated by God or Nature rather than by the state. Given that assumption, what he says makes sense: legal rights are of little value unless they are also de facto rights. (When Rollins refers to "real rights" as "those rights actually conferred and enforced by the laws of a State or the customs of a social group," he clearly has in mind de facto rights.) Just as it does me no good to have a legal right on paper that the state pays lip service to in theory but systematically ignores in practice, so it does me no good to have a natural right inscribed in the Law of Nature if no one is willing or able to enforce that right.

But this is the wrong way to think about natural rights. A natural right isn't a legal right, it's a normative right. To claim that natural rights don't protect anything is to miss the point; natural rights are supposed to receive protection, not to provide it. Likewise, the function of Natural Law is not to protect any claims, but rather to tell us which claims deserve protection. As normative concepts, natural rights provide guidance for people's conduct. Blaming natural rights for not protecting us is like blaming a cookbook for not making dinner. Cookbooks don't make dinner for us; their purpose is to teach us how to make dinner for ourselves. Likewise, Natural Law doesn't lead our lives for us; its purpose is to guide us in the living of our own lives.3

Long here wins the first argument.

However, Long had used a different definition of "natural rights" than what Rothbard uses. In addition, he has conflated "natural rights" and "natural law," which could mean two distinct topics.

A user named "wilderness" at the Mises Community has made the same mistake.

Taken to the further extreme it's why some can't figure out why protecting somebody's natural rights is in each individuals best interest. It's why somebody comes along and states, they "don't give a damn about liberty"... it's sickening. And why they can't understand murder, rape, and theft is not helpful. Secondly, cause of somebody like Rollins who is really confused.

Wilderness has conflated the "natural rights" written in the U.S. Constitution with the "natural law" of Rothbard.

Rollins is more willing than most critics of Natural Law to face the logical consequences of his position. But if morality is merely a tool for manipulating other people into doing what one wants, one wonders why people ever wrestle privately with moral dilemmas, why they ever find themselves compelled by conscience to do something that is unwelcome not only to themselves but to those around them.

More importantly, though, the question is why we should accept Rollins' claim that nothing is right or wrong and nothing is entitled to reverence. These are extraordinary claims, claims that run contrary to our ordinary beliefs and practices, and so the burden of proof rests with the person making such claims.

Long used a different definition of 'morality' than Rollins. Rollins does not reject 'morality' in the sense what Long uses. Therefore, Long made a strawman argument.

Long argues this from the "performative contradiction." Some self-identified "objectivists" use performative contradiction argument to criticize "subjectivism." They argue that "subjectivists believe that everything originate from subjective preference, but deny subjectivism itself as a subjective preference." However, the self-identified "objectivists" use a different definition of "subjectivism" than what the self-identified "subjecitivists" themselves do. The self-identified "subjectivists" could refute that argument by showing that each side uses a different definition of "subjective." They use the term "subjective" to mean beliefs and values in the mind.

Although we should not reject the "performative contradiction" as a valid argument, the performative contradiction argument has potential flaws. Its flaws stem from the soundness of its premises. The soundness of a performative contradiction argument depends on the soundness of its premises.

Some examples of performative contradiction arguments:

• It is self-contradictory to reject the Aristotelian laws of identity, the excluded middle, and non-contradiction.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ludwig von Mises' law of human action.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ludwig von Mises' psychological egoism.
• It is self-contradictory to reject "cogito, ergo sum."
• It is self-contradictory to reject Murray Rothbard's argument for self-ownership.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Hans-Hermann Hoppe's argumentation ethics.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Stephen Kinsella's estoppel argument.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Stefan Molyneux's universally preferable behavior.
• It is self-contradictory to reject Ayn Rand's, Douglas Rasmussen's, and Douglas Den Uyl's attempts to derive "ought" from "is."

Long conflated five different definitions of "amoralism."

In the moral case, for example, Rollins, a self-proclaimed "amoralist," chooses to hold on to what most would view as a highly implausible belief — the belief that there is nothing wrong with "murder, rape, robbery, or torturing children" — and to reject more plausible beliefs whenever they come into conflict with that one.

The first definition of "amoralism" signifies the descriptive notion that "rights do not tangibly exist." In the second sense, the term "amoralism" functions as a mere synonym for "quasi-realism" or "moral fictionalism." The third sense signifies the notion that using terms such as "right" and "wrong" in describing ethical commands can create conflicts between the interpretation of rights and grey areas. In the fourth sense "amoralism" signifies that "I do not feel any empathy for others. Therefore, I want to legalize rape and murder." The fifth sense of "amoralism" signifies irrelevant to morality, for example, "science is amoral because it does not deal with normative opinions."

Rollins probably used "amoralism" in the third sense, while Long probably used "amoralism" in the fourth sense.

We may think of our evolutionarily-implanted normative impulses as playing a role in moral reasoning analogous to the role that sensory experience plays in scientific reasoning. The data of the senses are one of the most important sources of our beliefs about how the universe works. But we are not confined to the sensory level. Our capacity for reason drives us to try to build up a conceptual picture of the universe that makes sense; and although we rely heavily on sensory data in building that picture, if we have to sacrifice some sensory data in order to achieve a scientific picture that makes a little more sense — if we have to decide that, despite initial appearances, the earth isn't flat, the sun doesn't circle it, and tables aren't continuously solid all the way down — then some of what the senses tell us may have to be scrapped for the sake of a more intellectually satisfying theory.

Long has used confusing terms such as "sensation," "perception," and "conception." He then equivocates "evolutionarily-implanted normative impulse" with the "sensory level." He has failed to define these three terms.

Likewise, our evolutionarily-implanted moral impulses are one of the most important sources of our beliefs about how we ought to live. But we are not confined to the instinctual level. Our capacity for reason drives us to try to build up a conceptual picture of right and wrong that makes sense; and although we rely heavily on innate impulses in building that picture, if we have to disregard some of our innate impulses in order to achieve a moral picture that makes a little more sense — if we have to decide that, despite our initial impulses, we shouldn't kill animals for food — then some of what our moral instincts tell us may have to be scrapped for the sake of a more intellectually satisfying ethic. Once again, a purely evolutionary account of our sense of morality, however illuminating, will be importantly incomplete.

Long presupposes a dichotomy between "innate impulse" and "reason." He then equivocates "innate impulse" with "evolutionarily-implanted normative impulse." I believe that Long has used a strawman argument against Rich Hammer. Hammer does not want to abolish "ethical reasoning" altogether in place of "evolutionarily-implanted normative instincts." If Hammer however wanted to abolish "ethical reasoning" altogether, then he would not have written his book.

This article is yet another example of how terminological differences can create chaos. Just imagine if we had resolved all of our terminological differences...

Psychological Egoism = Psychological Atomism

This is previously posted on the Ludwig von Mises forums.

It is arbitrary to label the brain as "egoistic" when the components of the brain are not. Likewise, it is absurd to label the brain as "egoistic" when composites of the "whole brain" are not.

Let us look into this. Assume that the human brain is divided into parts or modules. Each part functions independently with each other. However, they often conflict with each other.

Let us imagine a brain with three parts. One part of the brain, called area-A, deals with the maximization of pleasure. Another part of the brain, called area-B, deals with the maximization of acquiring wealth. Another part, area-C, deals with the minimization of pain.

How do they function? Area-A tries to maximize pleasure when area-C tries to minimize pain. They conflict with each other: does area-A want more pain at the tradeoff of more pleasure, or vice versa? Does area-A want desire short-term pleasure at the expense of long-term pain of area-C? How much pleasure and pain should each of these areas settle?

How does area-A and area-C resolve those conflicts? Area-A sometimes have to sacrifice pleasure for less pain in area-C. Area-C may have to increase pain threadhold for area-A to gain long-term pleasure in the future. All these actions involves area-A or area-C sacrificing with each other. Area-C may sometimes altruistically benefit area-A, and sometimes area-C may be altruistic to area-A.

Should we say that area-A and area-C behave in their own interests, or they collectively interact for the greater interest to "maximize" the "whole brain," the composite satisfaction of area-A, area-B, and area-C?

The question is that the interactions between the three components are selfish or the component parts -- areas-A, area-B, and area-C -- are each selfish but altruistic relative to the composite brain combined?

Let us look at the family.

We will use a metaphor of brain parts to represent family members. One part of the brain, called area-A, represents the mother. Another part represents, called area-B, represets the father. The third part represents, called area-C, represents the child.

The family members help each other. Each family member help one another when one is sick. Each help one another on housework. Why do all three family members help one another? Because they have an innate instinct to help each family member. Humans have evolved an instinct to help their kins. Therefore, can we describe the whole family as based on "self-interest"?

Each person is interconnected with one another in the form of an instinct to help each kin, for the greater benefit of the family. Similarly, each part of the brain conflict with each other, for the greater benefit of the aggregate brain.

Psychological egoists describe each family member as "egoistic" even when they help one another. This seems intuitively correct. However, could we say that each of the three parts of the brain are egoistic themselves, just like what each family member are?

Likewise, could we describe the aggregate "whole brain" is overall egoistic? Psychological egoists would tend to agree. But could we describe the family collectively itself as egoistic? Psychological egoists may intuitively disagree.

Each of the three brain components conflict and compromise with each other, producing an overall equilibrium. Similarly, each family member may conflict and compromise with each other, producing an overall equilibrium. Could we say that the overall equlibrium is "egoistic"? Could we say that the aggregates of the three components are as egoistic as the aggregates of the three family members?

Why do psychological egoists arbitrarily pick the brain as "egoistic," while the family member as a whole as not "egoistic"? This is very arbitrary.

One may object that the best level is to pick the individual brain, instead of groups more than one person. They claim that is is more accurate to analyze action on the individual level rather than the group level. They practice methodological individualism.

However, picking the "whole brain" as the starting point of egoism is very arbitrary. Why do psychological egoists deny that "the family as a whole" as not egoistic but assert that "the brain as a whole" as egoistic? All parts in these two interact, conflict, and compromise with each other, right?

Ex Post Facto Rationalizations in Ethics

Below is a full reply to Cork's post on abortion:

The legitimacy of abortion should have nothing to do with your interpretation of the non-aggression and the proportionality principle. The non-aggression principle can have potentially arbitrary interpretations.

As you know, not all self-described "libertarian anarchists" hold the same views. For instance, some libertarians support animal rights, some oppose abortion, some criticize retributive punishment, and some others support some parental authority. Those views conflict and compete with one another to attract attention.

As we have said previously, one could interpret the non-aggression principle in about a gazillion ways. Some anti-abortionists might feel cognitive dissonance, and thus interpret abortion as a form of aggression. Likewise, some others may interpret retributive punishment as a form of invasion against the criminal. Let us recall the problems of interpreting the non-aggression principle.

Does does the "non-aggression principle" allow "right to self-defense" or the "right to violently punish others"? Does the "non-aggression principle" allow trespassing or hate speech? We will show that the term "aggression" is highly vague.

Some will define "aggression" as "the initiation of physical violence." However, the term physical violence is also vague. Does "physical violence" include noise pollution? Does it include perceived threats of violence? Does "physical violence" include fraud? Whether noise pollution, threats of violence, and fraud are "physical violence" still begs the question.

Libertarians usually defend the right for broadcasters to homestead radio frequencies. However, if a malicious broadcaster "trespasses" another broadcaster's radio frequency, can we label this as "physical violence"? Obviously, the criminal changed nothing physical or tangible. This, also, begs the question whether if we should consider it as "physical violence." This same argument applies with the ownership of domain names.

Consequentially, it begs the question to ask whether anti-defamation laws violate the non-aggression principle. It also begs the question to ask whether the prohibition of nuclear weapons violate the non-aggression principle. In addition, it begs the question to ask whether ordering carbon dioxide polluters to pay restitution violates the non-aggression principle.

Libertarians define "individual sovereignty" as a state in which no one commits aggression against any individual. So far so good.

However, as we recall above, the word "aggression" has arbitrary interpretations. As a result, "individual sovereignty," which depends on the definition of "aggression," also has arbitrary interpretations. I found your usage of "self-ownership" in you elucidation above, therefore, as problematic.

As a consequence, we should only establish the definition of "libertarianism," "non-aggression principle," and "self-ownership" only prototypically. By "prototypically" we meant the prototype theory of classification. Libertarianism does not have any clear-cut "essence," and so does not "aggression" and "personal sovereignty."

Let us take abortion as an example of the arbitrariness of law.

The genuine causes of the abortion controversy arise from religion, empathy, and the definition of life.

Referring to the non-aggression principle constitutes as a type of cognitive dissonance. Judges, for example, use the law to legitimize their evil decrees. They have the power to interpret the law in any biased way, even though the law appears "objective" to the general population.

Legitimizing morality in the name of "it confirms/violates the non-aggression principle" is an appeal to the rule of law. It does not state any reason of the immorality itself, but an appeal to the law of non-aggression. It also begs the question if specific acts violate the non-aggression principle.

"Unborn babies" are parasites and if the mother does not want one in her body, she should not be forced to support one.

I have an objection. It depends on your definition of "parasite."

Aging can also be considered a parasite. So does cancer. If cancer is a parasite, does it give any right for the patient to steal money from a rich person for his treatment? It is a type of theft against the rich person.

Anti-abortionists consider fetuses as living beings. Like the cancer patent, the mother does not have any right to murder against another person, the fetus.

However, I do not oppose abortion. I am making a point that the non-aggression principle and laws can have potentially arbitrary interpretations, and could possibly justify any evil behavior.

The reason the cancer patient should not be allowed to steal from a "rich person" is because the rich person is *not* the parasite.

That is a common objection, but it still depends on the your interpretation of "parasite."

You agree that life is more valuable than property. The rich person can be interpreted as a kind of "parasite" you allow the person to be rich at the expense of killing someone. The rich person could just donate his money on the condition that the mother does not abort the child. So the rich person is causing the mother the kill her child by not donating to the mother. Therefore, you are valuing the rich person's property greater that you value the fetus's life. You do not support subsidizing the mother giving birth instead of aborting her child.

The law forbids murder and rape. Therefore, the would-be murderers and the would-be rapists cannot satisfy their preferences. The would-be victims of murder and rape are technically "parasites" in a sense, because we our preferences for life and against rape are brought about the expense of the preferences of the murderers and rapists. The victims of rape and murder are parasites in a sense and the murderers and rapists are the "victims" in a sense.

So do laws that forbid petty crimes such as adultery. Suppose a wife has cheated on her husband with another man. The wife, here, can both be a victim and a predator. She is a "victim" of the in the sense that the anti-adultery law does not grant her the liberty to cheat on her husband, then punished for it. She is an predator in a sense since she violated the adultery law and that she has angered her husband.

So the rich person can technically be interpreted as a parasite, in a sense. The enforcement of property rights have positive effects on the intelligent and the productive people, at the expense of the unproductive, the lazy, and the dim-witted people. Since the rich person is rich because of property rights, he is a parasite to the poor people. And, because, the enforcement of "property rights" is just a law that makes some more productive at the expense of others, it can form parasites and the exploited: The enforcement of property rights exploit the mentally incompetent, the disabled people, and the unproductive people.

The rich person is a parasite to the fetus in a way that the rich is not subsidizing the mother on the condition that the mother will not abort the fetus.

My point is that the rich person can be interpreted as a "parasite" in a sense, depending on one's self-knowledge. But we have to go back to my original point is that it is circular reasoning to justify laws from the non-aggression principle. It begs the question.

Anti-murder laws restrain the would-be murderer's liberty at the expense of the would-be victim's liberty to be alive. Anti-adultery laws retrain the would-be cheater's liberty at the expense of the spouse's liberty to not be cheated. Property laws restrain the disabled, lazy, mentally incompetent, and the unproductive's liberty at the expense of the liberty of the productive, efficient, and intelligent to create wealth. Pro-abortion laws restrain the fetus's liberty to stay alive at the expense of the rich person's willingness to not donate money to the pregnant mother.

Those who violate the non-aggression principle are labelled parasites, predators, aggressors, or criminals. Those who have experienced a violation of the non-aggression principle are called the victims, the prey, the exploited.

So terms such as "parasite," "predator," "aggressor," "tortfeasor," "criminal," "victim," and "prey" depend on one's definition or interpretation of the non-aggression principle or the law. These terms have different meanings according to one's perspective to the law.

Even libertarians themselves have different meanings for these terms. Some libertarians oppose retributive punishment, some oppose abortion, and some support animal rights. They therefore, have different interpretations of the words such as "parasite," "predator," and "victim." Your argument for abortion is like telling a libertarian who supports animal rights that the abused animals are not the "victims" of human "predators." Since they hold a differing interpretation of "aggression," your usage of these terms are circular, and might never influence them.

This is the reason why your sophistic arguments do not work. What we should be really debating with the anti-abortionists is religion and what constitutes human life.

Here's an example of natural law:

1. Each and every individual should enjoy the full product of his labor. No one else other than the individual can accurately estimate cost of labor that he has worked to produce a good. Therefore, no one else can exchange his good with another good or take his good without the individual's permission because the cost labor he has put into producing the good may be more than others may have perceived. Exchanging a good without consent should be forbidden because the individual may lose some fruits of his labor due to the fact that others may underestimate how much labor one worked to produce that good.
2. If both parties agree to exchange, the exchange is voluntary. Each individual can accurately estimate how much labor he has worked to produce his respective good. Each individual can also estimate the usability of his traders' goods. Therefore, both would maintain their full products of their labor, plus the value each benefited from the exchange.